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The present study uses the analytical framework of multi-level governance (MLG) to 
investigate the implementation of EU’s participatory rural development (RD) policy 
LEADER (Liaison Entre Actions de Développement de l'Économie Rurale" meaning 
"Links between the rural economy and development actions”) in Estonia, a country 
outside of the mainstream academic debates on MLG and LEADER. It provides insight 
into the restrictions on autonomy faced by the local action groups (LAGs), the local 
level implementers of the RD policy measure, at the doorstep of the 2014-2020 
programming period of EU structural funds. Even though LEADER is well-known for 
its bottom-up approach and finding solutions to local needs based on local resources and 
potential, it is actually very much influenced by the MLG framework within which it 
operates as well as the rules regulating its implementation, which in practice makes the 
local level constrained in what it is and what it is not allowed to do. 
The thesis investigates why the implementation of RD policies may diverge from 
the originally devised policy at the European level. Based on MLG theory all the levels 
included in the LEADER governance arrangement – the European (the European 
Commission), the national (the Managing Authority and the Paying Agency) and the 
local (the LAGs) – are expected to have a role to play in shaping the governance 
arrangement. The study first ascertains the degree of autonomy the EU level has 
intended to grant to the local level for policy implementation. As the second step it 
compares the actual implementation of the LEADER programme in Estonia to the EU 
level intentions and identifies a gap in-between. The study identifies that the restrictions 
which are causing the constraints faced by the LAGs have been introduced by the 
national level, not the EU level, and that these national level restrictions are undue. 
Thus the research finally establishes that the sub-national level has less autonomy in 
implementing LEADER than the EU level had initially intended because of the way the 
national level is involved in the governance arrangement and the additional restrictions 
it has introduced. This confirms the hypothesis that the involvement of the national 
level plays the decisive role in determining the eventual form of the governance 
arrangement. 
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To understand the process of European integration, it is important to consider 
developments not only at European and member states (MS) level, but also at the sub-
national level. Since the 1990s the concept of multi-level governance (MLG) has been 
used for incorporating the sub-national, including the local, level in analyzing the 
development of the regulatory framework in the EU and this is the theoretical analytical 
framework used also in the present thesis to study European rural development (RD) 
governance, and more precisely, LEADER1 as a governance arrangement.  
Rural regions find it difficult to cope with the decline in the agricultural sector. To 
facilitate this economic change the EU has devised a set of development policies. The 
RD policy is governed and funded by the European Commission (EC), but designed and 
co-funded by national governments, and in some cases, further developed at the sub-
national level. The EU’s RD policy helps the rural areas of the EU to meet the wide 
range of economic, environmental and social challenges of the 21st century.2  
For a RD policy to be effective, it has to be able to tackle various tasks and 
problems with flexible measures, which take account of the local situation and the 
diversity of rural areas. Thus local autonomy is important. To offer this, a special 
bottom-up oriented initiative LEADER was devised in 19913 at the initiative of the EC. 
The main concept of the approach is that local development strategies (LDS) are more 
effective if decided and implemented at the local level by local actors, supported by 
relevant public administrations. The LEADER approach is well in line with the EU’s 
general emphasis on subsidiarity and partnership. The present EU 2014-2020 
programming period4 is already witnessing the fifth generation of LEADER, currently 
being implemented with European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD).  
                                                           
1LEADER  -  coming from the French sentence “Liaison Entre Actions de Développement de l'Économie 
Rurale" which means "Links between the rural economy and development actions” 
2See EC’s website for a section on Rural Development 2014-2020 (European Commission) 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rural-development-2014-2020/index_en.htm 
3On March 15, 1991, the Commission of the European Communities, acting pursuant to Article 11 of 
Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 (See: (Commission of the European Communities, 1988) ), decided to 
establish the LEADER initiative to serve as a model for RD.  For more information see: (European 
Commission) http://cordis.europa.eu/programme/rcn/312_en.html 
4EU programming periods respect the Multiannual Financial Frameworks which set the annual budgets 
for 7 year periods.  
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The EC believes that the principles behind the approach are working, as from 
being piloted as a Community Initiative, LEADER was mainstreamed, gaining wider 
use in RD. It became an integral part of Rural Development Plans (RDP) and it is 
obligatory that at least 5% of the EAFRD contribution to the RDP must be spent on 
LEADER. Even further ‒ as LEADER has been recognized as a good example of 
governance on the local level, during the current programming period also other struc-
tural funds (SF)5 in addition to EAFRD are encouraged to incorporate the principles of 
MLG and partnership and use the community-led local development (CLLD) approach. 
According to EC’s basic guide to LEADER6, the main reason to use this approach stems 
from the need to direct local initiative towards finding local solutions. 
The present study focuses on LEADER governance in Estonia, contributing new 
empirical insights from a country outside of the mainstream academic debates on MLG 
and LEADER 7. The choices underlying this focus of the research are described below. 
Mainstream integration theories do not take account of the role of the sub-national 
authorities in the governance setting and are of limited use in analysing EU regional 
policy. Therefore MLG ‒ the first concept to thoroughly examine the position of the 
local level within the EU polity8 ‒ is used in the thesis as the theoretical approach. MLG 
can in a very broad sense be divided into taking two forms – type I (general purpose, 
multifunctional authorities with fixed structures at limited levels having more formal 
devolution of powers) and type II MLG (flexible, specialized, task-driven authorities, 
each being set up to address specific problems)9. There has been quite extensive 
research on type I MLG. The present thesis contributes to investigate the less 
researched, type II MLG10. LEADER is an example of a type II, task-driven MLG 
arrangement, which accounts for the choice of the funding programme to be researched.  
Another important aspect is the fact that the LEADER programme started as a 
Community Initiative, being a part of the regional policy setting where the EC was 
dominant. The EC had the power and authority to launch Community Initiatives even if 
                                                           
5SFs are the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund  
6(European Commission, 2006) pp. 5-6 
7See literature review on MLG in Chapter 1.1 and 1.2. For literature review on LEADER as well as the 
place the present study seeks to occupy in this strand of research, see Chapter 2.3.  
8See for example: (Marks, 1993), (Bache & Flinders, 2004a), (Hooghe & Marks, 2003), (Kull, 2014) 
9For more information on type I and II MLG see (Hooghe & Marks, 2003) and (Marks & Hooghe, 2004) 
10See (Marks & Hooghe, 2004) pp 22-24 for locating type I MLG examples and pp 24-27 for type II  
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MS were not entirely happy with them or wanted in some way to restrict them11, i.e. the 
EC played a defining role in shaping the governance arrangement. Later LEADER was 
mainstreamed into the general set-up of SFs, which makes it interesting to look at to 
what extent the EC currently can determine the shape of the eventual governance 
arrangement, given the need to involve national governments. 
Research on MLG in small centralized states is quite limited12, therefore the 
author’s choice to study LEADER governance in Estonia is an important contribution to 
this under-searched field13. Estonia is a small and centralized country and unlike bigger 
countries, where sub-national LEADER governance levels include both the regional and 
the local level, here LEADER governance is limited to the EU, state and local levels. 
There has been quite extensive research14 on LEADER implementation in the EU 
during the previous programming periods. An added value of the present thesis is to 
provide insight into the regulative framework for the 2014-2020 programming period. 
This will enable to identify, if solutions have been found in the present programming 
period to the constraints of local level autonomy in the governance arrangement, which 
were identified by researchers during previous budget periods in other EU countries.  
Given the made choices, there are certain limitations in the work. The research is 
a single case study in two ways – it focuses on a single programme, i.e. LEADER, and 
on a single country, i.e. Estonia. Thus it is not a comparative study and neither 
comparison of different programmes, programming periods nor cross-country 
comparison15 are in the focus of the thesis. Examples given on LEADER in other EU 
countries serve the purpose to embed the study in context of a wider debate of LEADER 
governance, since in Estonia the first projects were submitted for funding only in 2009, 
but in the EU the initiative was set up already in 1991. As the 2014-2020 programming 
period is in the starting phase, it is neither possible to assess project implementation by 
beneficiaries nor the impact of the policy. The thesis thus builds on the concerns voiced 
by local action groups (LAGs) on the expected limitations of the beneficiaries. 
                                                           
11(Boyle, 2006) p 205 
12For notable exceptions, see (Adshead, 2014) and (Nousiainen & Mäkinen, 2015) 
13There has been a scientific article about LEADER programme in Estonia by an employee of the 
Ministry of Agriculture (Aunapuu-Lents, 2013), an article on Estonian municipalities and MLG (Kull & 
Tartar, 2015) and an article on RD in Estonia (Kull, Voutilainen, Christopoulos, & Reimets, 2014) 
14See for example: (Thuesen & Nielsen, 2014), (Berriet-Solliec et al., 2015), (Kull, 2014), (Nousiainen & 
Mäkinen, 2015), (Pollerman, Raue, & Schnaut, 2014a). More examples are to be found in chapter 2.3 




A further caveat is in place with regard to the aim and scope of MLG as an 
analytical framework. It focuses on how particular policy processes in EU polity are 
working (who is empowered to participate, what is interaction like in the MLG 
arrangement, what consequences does it have on the status of the involved actors).16 If 
viewed critically, using the concept of MLG could thus make the present research 
appear descriptive-analytical rather than causally-oriented. Nevertheless, MLG as well 
as the present thesis do explain why a certain outcome, i.e. governance arrangement, 
emerges. The thesis aims to investigate why the implementation of RD policies may 
diverge from the originally devised policy at the European level. The main research 
question is: “Why does the sub-national level have less autonomy for implementing 
LEADER than the supranational level has initially intended when devising this RD 
policy?” This will be explored looking at the specific case of the LEADER  approach.  
In the present thesis autonomy is understood as the possibility of the local level to 
act according to the general LEADER principles and the intentions of the EU within the 
rather wide frames set by EU level regulations. Limitations to autonomy are understood 
as narrower operation conditions than those devised by the EU level, both for the LAGs 
as well as for the project beneficiaries, and measured by comparing respective EU and 
national level regulations as well as the specific requirements stated by LAGs as being 
most restrictive in their daily operations. Additional limitations are understood as undue 
restrictions faced by the sub-national level introduced by the national level, which are 
significantly limiting the rules and principles outlined by the EC for the approach. 
The original contribution of the thesis is provision of an in-depth investigation of 
the LEADER programme and its governance in Estonia. Spotlight is put on the different 
levels involved in this RD governance arrangement and especially the degree of 
autonomy granted to the local level in LEADER implementation.  This approach 
enables to elaborate one case in great detail and demonstrate the way how interaction 
between different governance levels shapes the outcome of the policy. The LEADER 
governance arrangement means in the present thesis the inclusion of different levels and 
their interests in the implementation of this specific RD policy. First, the EU level 
intentions for LEADER on the supranational level (i.e. the main aim and the basic 
principles of this RD policy, as originally devised by the EC). Second, the national level 
                                                           
16(Kull, 2014) p 9 
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rules and restrictions on: a) the functioning and operations of the LAGs17 
(implementation of the programme); and b) eligible project activities and costs 
(implementation of the projects). The first and the second determine the range and scope 
of activities, which can be done within the projects being implemented by the 
beneficiaries on the local level, their results and impact (i.e. the outcome of the policy).  
Based on MLG theory, the author expects all the three levels included in the 
governance system – the supranational, national and sub-national – to have their own 
interests shaping the way in which the policy is implemented and therefore affecting the 
resulting governance arrangement. This means that according to MLG, the specific way 
in which LEADER is implemented on the local level by the LAGs and project 
beneficiaries and the degree of autonomy granted to them, derives from the involvement 
of multiple governance levels in policy implementation: the European (EC), the national 
(the Ministry of Rural Affairs and Estonian Agricultural Registers and Information 
Board) and the local (LAGs) levels or in other words – policy outcomes reflect the 
involvement of multiple levels in the implementation of the RD policy.  
MLG theory assumes significant influence of the local level, but there are also 
arguments18 that the theory is too optimistic in the degree of influence it ascribes to the 
local level, particularly as far as RD is concerned. This means that also in RD policy 
implementation the local level influence could be smaller than MLG theory expects. 
Also the present study expects the local level, namely the LEADER implementing 
LAGs, to be on a relatively weak position when it comes to their actual influence in the 
governance arrangement. Even though LEADER is well-known for its bottom-up 
approach, it is actually very much influenced by the MLG framework19 within which it 
operates as well as the rules regulating its implementation. In practice this makes the 
local level quite constrained and has an effect on the policy outcome, i.e. the impacts of 
the RD policy brought about by implementing LEADER-funded projects.  
                                                           
17LAGs are made up of public and private partners from the rural territory, and must include 
representatives from different socio-economic sectors. They receive financial assistance to implement 
LDSs, by awarding grants to local projects. They are selected by the managing authority of the MS, 
which is either a national, regional or local, private or public body responsible for the management of the 
programme. See: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rur/leaderplus/index_en.htm (European Commission) 
Leader+ website 
18See for example: (Kull, 2014), (Yang, Rounsevell, Haggett, & Wilson, 2015), (Jordan, 2001) 
19For the sake of clarity it is important to note that in the present thesis MLG from a theoretical 
perspective is utilized mostly as a descriptive-analytical concept, albeit without neglecting its normative 
dimension; in the context of EU RD policies MLG is a governance mode (a way of doing things). 
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The author expects the strong involvement of the national government in the 
MLG framework to significally affect policy outcomes and to distort the initial 
intentions of the EU in regional policy. The hypothesis thus is that the main intervening 
variable, decisive in determining the eventual form of the governance arrangement ‒ the 
level of autonomy of the local level in policy implementation ‒ is the involvement of 
the national level. As all the three levels are expected to have their influence on policy 
implementation, the author puts forward three sub-questions to measure each level:       
1) What degree of autonomy is intended by the EU in formulating its RD policy?         
2) How is LEADER implemented at the local level? 3) What additional restriction on 
the degree of autonomy is introduced by the national level? 
The body of the thesis is made up of three interconnected parts – 1) MLG theory, 
2) LEADER as a RD approach, and 3) analysis of LEADER implementation in Estonia. 
The first chapter explains MLG, the theoretical framework for the thesis, from the 
European integration theory and RD context and concludes with a section describing 
research design and methods. The second chapter describes the LEADER approach, its 
development, experiences from EU countries and brings out EU level intentions.  
The original contribution of the present thesis is most visible in the third chapter, 
in-depth analysis of the Estonian case study.  The author collects empirical data from 
LAGs on the constraints they are facing in LEADER implementation. By comparing the 
realized constraints with the legislation regulating LEADER implementation, the author 
demonstrates, which additional restrictions on the degree of autonomy are introduced by 
the state level. The main research question finds an answer ‒ the sub-national level has 
less autonomy in implementing LEADER than the supranational level had initially 
intended because of the national level intervention. The national level plays a strong 
role in the governance arrangement and has introduced additional restrictions. This 
confirms the hypothesis that the involvement of the national level plays the decisive role 
in determining the eventual form of the governance arrangement. The final chapter 
makes a conclusion of the thesis and presents author’s recommendations for the future 
of the policy as well as ideas for additional research.   
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1. Multi-level Governance and Rural Governance 
 
1.1 Multi-level governance in European integration theory context 
 
To understand EU policies from a MLG perspective it is important to understand the 
context in which these policies were shaped20.  To understand why a theory has 
developed in a particular way, it is also important to understand the context in which the 
theory arose, which is why a brief overview of the developments as well as the key 
tenets of the MLG approach will be given.  
Since the 1990s older well-established European integration theories such as 
Federalism, Functionalism or Neo-functionalism have had to compete with new ones 
such as MLG. The question in focus is not any more why MS integrate but rather how 
this integration is realized, who is empowered to participate, how does supranational –
national – sub-national interaction take place and what consequences does this have on 
the actors involved.21 This means that the focus has turned from explaining European 
integration to explaining policy-making under the condition of European integration. 
As another trend, the focus has shifted from trying to anticipate the overall result 
of a successful integration process to describing particular policy processes within the 
EU polity. This analytical-descriptive approach narrows the focus of analysis and 
fosters specialization. Yet, at the same time, as Kull argues, increasing specialization 
poses also a challenge to research as policy sectors and programmes can increasingly 
only be assessed after first having accumulated a great deal of technical expertise.22 
The conventional theories such as Neofunctionalism and Liberal Inter-
governmentalism do not include the sub-national level and especially local level actors 
in their analytical frames. But as Maastricht and Lisbon Treaties have empowered sub-
national actors and cooperation and networks are increasingly important in the present 
EU polity, the concept of MLG, bringing into view the sub-national and local levels, has 
increasingly come to be on the picture.23  
                                                           
20
 (Kull, 2014) p 9 
21For a discussion on the origins of MLG in EU studies see (Bache & Flinders, 2004b) pp 2-3, for an 
overview of the development of MLG over two decades see (Stephenson, 2013) 
22(Kull, 2014) p 10. In this light, the present research draws on the author’s experience, working with 
LEADER implementation as a LAG manager since the programme was first launched in Estonia in 2006. 
23For a discussion on MLG in relation to other theories see (George, 2004) and  (Kull, 2014) pp 10-20 
 13 
 
During the 1980-1990ies EU’s supranational institutions were empowered and 
also new forms of interaction, such as the partnership principle in regional policy 
decision-making, emerged.24 The partnership requirement gave sub-national actors a 
formal role in the EU policy process for the first time. “In subsequent years, the 
Commission pushed for and secured agreement to the greater involvement of non-state 
actors (non-governmental organisations, trade unions, environmental groups etc.) within 
the process...”25 Initially, the partnership principle focused on promoting interaction 
between governmental actors from different levels, but has increasingly placed greater 
emphasis on engaging non-state actors and thus has both vertical and horizontal 
dimensions.26 Thus it can be said that the partnership principle is an element of 
governance, whereby other actors and stakeholders besides the government take part in 
governance. 
Partnership shares with subsidiarity the notion that “decisions are taken as closely 
as possible to the citizen”27, as stated in the opening paragraph of the Treaty on EU. 
However, partnership thinks of the relationship between levels of government as 
interacting, not being autonomous. Instead of making sub-national governments 
independent within a clear framework of powers and obligations and handing some 
issues exclusively at the sub-national level, partnership involves governments at local, 
regional, national and supranational levels in multifaceted patterns of mutual 
influence.28 
As a result of the changes in the real world and restructured forms of participation 
in the EU, Marks suggested the term MLG in 1993. He states 
 
I believe we are witnessing the emergence of multilevel governance in the European 
Community, characterized by co-decisionmaking across several nested tiers of 
government, ill-defined and shifting spheres of competence (creating a consequent 
potential for conflicts about competencies), and an ongoing search for principles of 
decisional distribution that might be applied to this emerging polity.29 
 
                                                           
24
 (Bache & Olsson, 2001)    p 216 
25
 (Bache, 2005) p 5 
26
 (Bache, 2010) p 7 
27(Council of the European Communities, Commission of the European Communities, 1992) 
28
 (Marks, Structural Policy and Multilevel Governance in the EC, 1993) p 406 
29
 Ibid., p 407 
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Being among the first ones to conceptualise MLG in the EU, he argued that we are 
seeing the emergence of MLG, “a system of continuous negotiation among nested 
governments at several territorial tiers – supranational, national, regional and 
local.”30 When first proposing the term, Marks focused on sub-national government 
and trans-national networks. Research on the involvement of private actors, social 
partners and interest organizations was focused on at a later stage, when MLG was 
further conceptualized.31 
Scholars of MLG assume that all three levels – the supranational, national and 
sub-national levels – may hold a powerful position in the policy-making process as they 
may have different access levels to policy formulation and implementation. “MLG 
implies engagement and influence – no level of activity being superior to the other – 
and, therein, a mutual dependency through the intertwining of policy-making 
activities”32. This means that policy outcomes will be shaped by all the three levels 
involved. The sub-national level features most prominently in the implementation stage 
and thus the outcome on sub-national level could differ from the one that was intended 
by the supranational level in the first place.  It is important that all levels tend to be 
bound together and interconnected in formal or informal networks.33  
Beyond the agreement that flexible governance has become and must be multi-
level, there is no consensus about how MLG should be organized and structured. To 
deal with the growing complexities of EU policy-making Marks, together with his 
colleague Hooghe, improved the MLG concept34 by further conceptualizing earlier 
observations on systems of EU MLG and introduced type-I and type-II MLG. Both 
types of governance share one fundamental feature: they are major departures from the 
centralized state, unravelling the central state and diffusing authority, but in contrasting 
ways.  
Type I MLG describes power and authorities at a limited number of levels. These 
authorities – e.g. international, national, regional, and local – have general purposes and 
are multifunctional, including different policy responsibilities. The membership borders 
of such authorities do not overlap. Territorial jurisdictions are stable for a long time 
                                                           
30(Marks, 1993) p 391 
31(Kull, 2014) p 1 
32(Stephenson, 2013) p 817 
33(Kull, 2014) p 28 
34(Hooghe & Marks, 2003) p 236 and (Marks & Hooghe, 2004) 
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period, but there is flexibility in how policy competencies are allocated across 
jurisdictional levels. Type II MLG is different, as it is made up of specialized, task-
driven authorities, each being set up to address specific problems. The number of such 
jurisdictions can be very big, and the area of operation may greatly vary. They are 
flexible and come and cease to exist as demands for governance change.35 Most type II 
jurisdictions target specific policy problems (e.g. LEADER as a RD policy). Public-
private partnerships are characteristic to type II (e.g. LAGs) and being issue-specific, 
type II jurisdictions involve all governance structures related to the specific policy.   
Type I and Type II MLG in nowadays governance and polities often exist 
together.36 One example for a type-II task-driven unit of governance from rural Europe 
is the LEADER LAG and its position in MLG of rural areas.37  Co-existence and 
embededness can be elaborated by bringing an example from LEADER decision-
making process (which by nature is type-II MLG, as it is task-driven), where different 
administrative levels (type-I MLG administrative structures like ministries, agencies 
etc) are involved.  The national level has a powerful position – as it has the authority 
e.g. to reform the overall administrative structure (type-I), by doing so it empowers 
itself within type-II MLG structures and can retain control. For example the national 
level can decide by introducing a regulation, that it will take the right of making 
project’s funding decisions away from the sub-national, LAG level and give the right to 
the national level (e.g. the Paying Agency), thus empowering itself and being an 
effective gatekeeper. 
According to the MLG model decision making competencies are shared by actors 
at different levels instead of being monopolized by state executives.38 When in a state-
centric governance setting the legal authority is decisive, then in MLG the influence of 
actors is based on a combination of different resources like information, organization, 
expertise, finances, as well as legitimacy. According to state-centric governance state 
has exclusive competencies, but according to MLG competencies are shared between 
actors at different levels. The nature of state-centric governance is hierarchical, MLG is 
characterized by interdependent actors at different levels of governance.  
                                                           
35(Hooghe & Marks, 2003) p 236 
36
 (Bache, 2010) p 2 
37(Kull, 2014) p 38 
38
 (Marks, Hooghe, & Blank, 1996) p 346 
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Lack of autonomous control has advantages as well as disadvantages for MS 
executives. For example, civil servants can hide behind decisions that are made on the 
EU level and claim that it is needed to adjust to arrangements which they cannot 
change39. Linking this to LEADER implementation in Estonia, there have been cases 
where the Managing Authority (MA) on the national level has also tried to use this 
tactic, trying to leave an impression to the sub-national level (LAGs) that a rule which 
in reality is a national restriction, comes from the EU and should not be questioned. 
According to MLG theory, sub-national governments are likely to develop 
vertical links with the EC, bypassing MSs and thereby challenging their traditional 
intermediating role between sub-national and supranational levels of government (e.g. 
creating direct links with the EC by opening an office in Brussels).40 Continuous 
forming of direct links between sub-national governments and the EC at the same time 
creates possibilities for creating a coalition against the middle level, i.e., MS.41 This 
means that the local level, together with the supranational level, may push for a greater 
degree of autonomy for the local level in the policy formulation phase.42  
In short, MLG tries to provide a simplified understanding of what European 
policy-making looks like on a day-to day basis in policy areas, where multiple actors 
participate at different levels from the supranational to the sub-national.43 What MLG 
can explain is how governance is arranged in an easy-to-grasp way, i.e. how the 
European Union performs as a “polity” and “machinery”.44 
In addition to being a descriptive, explanatory and analytical framework, i.e. how 
things are done, MLG framework has a normative component45 to it, in this view 
something that should be used because of being superior to other governance 
arrangements. As Bache and Flinders state, MLG is “emerging as a normatively 
superior mode of allocating authority.”46 According to Stephenson,47 the normative 
                                                           
39(Marks, Hooghe, & Blank, 1995) p 28 
40(Marks, 1993) p 402 
41Ibid., p 402 
42The author considers it important to note that the present study does not investigate the influence the 
local level/the national level has on policy formulation at the European level, but only the down-stream 
from a devised policy to its implementation. 
43(Stephenson, 2013) pp 817-818 
44(Kohler-Koch & Eising, 1999) p xi 
45For a discussion on MLG as a normative concept see (Bache & Flinders, Multi-level Governance, 
2004a) pp 195-196, (Stephenson, 2013) pp 826-828, (Papadopoulos, 2010) 
46
 (Bache & Flinders, 2004a) p 195 
47For a more extensive discusion on normative uses of MLG see (Stephenson, 2013) p 826-827 
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aspect includes concepts such as legitimacy, democracy, efficiency, accountability, 
which build on the Commission’s White Paper on European Governance48 that aims to 
establish more democratic governance and advocates the principle of participation.49 
Having described the essence of MLG theory50, it is important to bring out also 
certain aspects that have been underrepresented in the theory. MLG as a theory has been 
criticized, saying it provides a thorough description of undergoing changes in European 
governance, but unlike standard theories “lacks a causal motor of integration or a set of 
testable hypotheses”.51 Yet this critic has been considered unfair, because MLG is not 
an integration theory and thus should not be blamed for not providing an explanation of 
European integration.52 This means that MLG does not focus on why MSs integrate but 
rather how governance is realized under the condition of European integration. Also the 
criticism on lack of causal hypothesis is considered unsustainable by George, who finds 
that the initial hypothesis of MLG relates to the question if the EU is a system of MLG 
rather than a system dominated by national governments and the hypothesis in a 
generalized way is that “the hierarchy of levels of governance is being eroded”.53 
Similarly in the context of the present study the main research question and the 
hypothesis are about the involvement of different levels in the governance arrangement 
and hence in shaping the eventual policy outcome. 
Jordan has argued that the MLG approach has its weaknesses concerning the 
influence of the sub-national level.54 He claims that MLG “greatly overstates the 
autonomy of sub-national actors even in policy areas where one would expect it to 
perform quite well”.55 According to him sub-national actors bypassing states and 
operating independently does not automatically mean that they have the power to shape 
the outcomes. In other words, involvement and influence are not necessarily the same.56 
This means that the sub-national level may bypass the state and address directly the 
                                                           
48For more information see the White Paper (European Commission, 2001) 
49The author acknowledges the importance of normative considerations in MLG. In the present thesis 
MLG is primarily utilized as an analytical-descriptive framework, however the autor returns to the 
normative implications especially in the discussion and concluding part of the research. 
50For an overview of MLG as well as its criticism please see: (Bache & Flinders, Multi-level Governance, 
2004a)  
51(Jordan, 2001) p 201 
52(George, 2004) p 113 
53Ibid., p 116 and p 125 
54
 For a discussion on MLG overstating the role of sub-national level see (George, 2004) pp 118-122 
55
 (Jordan, 2001) p 201 
56
 Ibid., p 201 
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supranational level, but as the national level can have constraining influence on policy 
implementation acting as the gatekeeper57, this act of bypassing is not likely to 
influence the outcome to a considerable extent.58 Hence impact of the national level has 
bigger influence on policy implementation than MLG theory actually suggests. For the 
level of autonomy of LEADER implementation at the local level in Estonia this means 
that possibly the national level plays a stronger role than the MLG theory would 
initially suggest.  
It has been questioned by Jordan, Kull and Scharp59 whether MLG is applicable to 
all sectors and levels60. While MLG was the first concept to thoroughly examine the 
position of local levels of public administration and other local actors within the EU 
polity, in the opinion of Kull it is too optimistic in the degree of influence it ascribes to 
local levels, particularly as far as rural areas are concerned.61 Rural areas and the local 
level are very heterogeneous. As a methodological shortcoming Kull criticizes that 
MLG underestimates the role of the government institutions located at higher levels and 
their ability to preserve their powerful positions in the MLG system. MLG was initially 
meant to describe the interaction of multiple actors in EU regional policy and structural 
funding. This research puts focus not only on a certain policy field (RD) but especially 
on its sub-field, LEADER. The latter, with its MLG mode, provides a particularly 
interesting field of research to investigate the emergence of a MLG arrangement in RD, 
especially the influence the national level plays in its shaping as well as the actual 
influence of the local level.  
Given the aspects described above, MLG will be used in the present thesis as an 
analytical-descriptive tool to help to understand the eventual outcome of a governance 
arrangement, and the ways how this end result has been influenced by the different 
governance levels involved in a rural policy implementation. Based on this theory, the 
current study will investigate whether actors other than government are as powerful as 
                                                           
57For more information see: (Bache, 2011) 
58The author acknowledges that even if the national level does retain the gatekeepre function, this does 
not per se contradict MLG, as the latter does to presrcibe the realtive influence of different levels but 
merely indicates that the involvement of different levels will be decisive for the eventual outcome. 
59See (Jordan, 2001) p 193, (Kull, 2014) p 39, (Scharpf, 1997) 
60The author acknowledges that question of generalisation of research findings for other policy fields 
should be taken into account when making conclusions based on the thesis. Yet for empirical analysis of 
the research the criticism does not pose a problem as salience of MLG for RD policy is not put in 
question. For other studies that apply MLG on RD see for example: (Nousiainen & Mäkinen, 2015), 
(Bruszt, 2008), (Pollerman, Raue, & Schnaut, 2014a), (Kull, 2008), (Thuesen A. A., 2013) 
61(Kull, 2014) p 39 
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MLG expects in shaping policy or whether, as critics have noted, the national level 
intervenes with its own interests, asserting itself and taking the role of an effective 
gatekeeper in the governance arrangement. 
 
1.2 Multi-level governance in regional, rural and local development 
 
MLG has been used by policy makers and scholars to refer to any of the three processes: 
“change in territorial government, the remaking of territorial developmental 
governance, or just the ending of the decision-making monopoly of the government 
implying some involvement of regions in policy-making”.62 The number of theories on 
regional development is constantly increasing. Over the last two decades there has been 
a distinct move from exogenous approaches (driven from outside) to endogenous ones 
(driven from within).63 RD is “a process that occurs within an increasing complexity of 
rural areas and which produces – and is reproduced – by a multilevel and 
multidimensional network of players”.64  
Despite the heterogeneity, the most widespread trend over the last two or three 
decades in European RD policy, under the predominant conception of a model of 
endogenous development (e.g. the LEADER programme), has  been  to  promote  
increasing  diversification  in  order  to  accommodate  various economic activities and 
new lifestyles. This is based on the argument that every region or community should 
develop by taking advantage of whatever existing or potential local comparative 
advantage may lie within the spectrum of economic activities.65 The role of RD policies 
is not about devising strategies for RD, but rather to support and accompany local 
initiatives (LEADER approach being one of them) “in achieving virtuous processes that 
result in the multidimensional sustainability of the area itself”.66 A suitable RD policy 
should enable to act on different tasks with flexible measures.67 
Regional policy and rural policy are part of structural policy. Marks sees 
structural policy in the EU as a two-sided process, involving decentralization of 
                                                           
62(Bruszt, 2008) p 608 
63(Galdeano-Gómez, Aznar-Sánchez, & Pérez-Mesa, 2011) p 54 
64(Ventura, Milone, & van der Ploeg, 2010) p 1-2 
65(Galdeano-Gómez, Aznar-Sánchez, & Pérez-Mesa, 2011) p 56 
66(Ventura, Milone, & van der Ploeg, 2010) p 26 
67(Pollerman, Raue, & Schnaut, 2014a) p 3 
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decision-making to sub-national levels of government as well as centralization of new 
powers at the supranational level. “In structural policy we see a centrifugal process in 
which decision-making is spun away from member states in two directions: up to 
supranational institutions and down to diverse units of sub-national government”.68 He 
claims that structural policy has provided sub-national governments and the EC with 
new political resources and opportunities in an emerging multilevel policy arena.69 
From the point of MLG theory this means that the supranational level is expected to 
have a strong role (e.g. in policy formulation) and so is the local level (e.g. in policy 
implementation), but the role of the national level is expected to be limited. 
Examining the operation of structural policy, with the 1988 reform of the 
structural funds the EC shifted from its previous role as hands-off financial manager to 
that of an active participant in framing and monitoring regional development 
programs.70 Prior to the reform the implementation system of the ERDF was established 
independently by the national government in each MS. The creation of regional 
partnerships for administering the structural funds in 1988 was an attempt by the EC to 
empower sub-national actors at the expense of national government domination over the 
implementation process.71  Following the reform, it was thus expected that even though 
remaining part of the process, the state level is no longer in control, and because of 
bypassing the national level to an extent, the outcomes of policy implementation are 
likely not to reflect directly the interests of the MSs. This meaning in turn, a stronger 
role for supranational and local level can be expected in this policy area. 
Programming effectively commits actors to work together in partnership for a 
sustained period of time in developing and implementing regional strategies.72 EC-
controlled Community Initiative programmes were also introduced as part of the 1988 
reform.73 A significant portion of total structural spending during the funding period 
1989-1993 was allocated this way directly by the EC in the form of Community 
Initiatives74, an example of which is also LEADER. Putting this in the MLG 
framework, such multiannual programming empowered the EU and it is expected that 
                                                           
68(Marks, 1993) p 402 
69Ibid., p 403 
70Ibid., p 395 
71(Bache, 2011) p 35 
72(Bache, 2010) p 7 
73(Bache, 2011) p 32 
74(Marks, 1993) p 399 
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the intentions of the EU level are going to be reflected in the policy implementation and 
outcomes75. Given the leading role of the EC in defining the Community Initiatives,  the 
local level was intended to be given a relatively high degree of autonomy in policy 
implementation and the national level was not expected to determine the priorities at the 
local, implementation level. 
The EC’s failure to make progress on the key principle of additionality was an 
important illustration of the resistance of national governments to the erosion of their 
control over domestic policy.76 An example can be brought, where despite the efforts of 
the EC and the mobilization of sub-national actors, an extended gatekeeper role was 
successfully played by the UK central government during the implementation of EC 
regional policy. The reform set the conditions for implementation, but within that 
particular bargaining process national government controlled sufficient resources to 
ensure a satisfactory policy outcome.77 
According to Bache there is much evidence of multi-level participation in the 
implementation of EC regional policy (e.g. in the case of UK), but the extent to which it 
constitutes multi-level governance is unclear. This is relevant also for the Estonian case, 
where participation as such is existent (e.g. partnership principle is met by local level 
representatives being represented in different committees etc) but it does not necessarily 
mean that they are taking part in governance, as generally there is no involvement in the 
decision-making, which is left to be done to the national level. Where the gatekeeper 
notion is useful in describing the behaviour of national governments in the EU policy-
making, it makes sense to refer to an extended gatekeeper that can function at all stages 
of the policy making process, including implementation phase.78 This means that when 
the gatekeeper notion was used in the context of policy making, then in MLG, which is 
predominantly about policy implementation, there could be a wider term used, and 
hence the suggestion to call it extended gatekeeper. What this shows is that the role of 
the national level could actually be bigger than what was expected by the early works in 
MLG theory. When the national level makes itself felt at the implementation stage, it is 
likely also shaping the outcomes of the policy. This means that the constraining 
                                                           
75The author acknowledges the involvement of the national level and inclusion of its interests in policy 
formulation, as MSs would be involved in defining EU level intentions. 
76(Bache, 2011) p 31 
77Ibid., p 38 
78Ibid., p 42 
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capacity of the national level between the European and the local levels has to be taken 
into account when considering the eventual outcome of a policy. Whether the set 
hypothesis on the national level being the main intervening variable, decisive in 
determining the eventual form of the LEADER governance arrangement is true, the 
author will examine in the third chapter, analysing the legislative documents as well as 
presenting empirical evidence from the case study of implementing LEADER in 
Estonia. 
 
1.3 Research problem and methodology 
 
The thesis aims to identify factors decisive for why the implementation of RD policies 
may diverge from the originally devised policy at the European level. This will be done 
looking at the specific case of LEADER for local development, which is a MLG 
governance arrangement including the EU level, the national level and the local level. 
Based on MLG theory described in chapters 1.1 and 1.2, the author expects all the 
levels included in the governance system – the supranational, national and sub-national 
– to have their own interests which shape the particular governance arrangement. As all 
the three levels are expected to have their influence, the author puts forward three sub-
questions to measure each level of the governance arrangement.  
To answer the first sub-question “What degree of autonomy is intended by the EU 
in formulating its RD policy?”, the author seeks to identify to what extent the EU 
regulates the functioning of LAGs and the activities of project beneficiaries. In order to 
determine what are the restrictions the supranational level devises with regard to the 
autonomy of the sub-national level, the author identifies the legal provisions and 
requirements set on a) the LAG as a local level actor (its structure, setup, decision 
making) and b) the project beneficiaries’ specific project activities (what kind of 
activities can actually be done in rural areas with LEADER funded projects to promote 
RD, i.e. the actual outcome of the RD policy) in the relevant regulations79. The same 
logic – covering both the LAGs as well as the project beneficiaries – is followed also in 
the next two sub-questions. The intended autonomy is thus measured by what the EU 
sets as limitations in their day-to-day operation concerning the LAGs and the project 
                                                           
79The most important regulations being the CPR 1303/2013 and EAFRD regulation 1305/2013 as well as 
the guidance documents provided by the EU to interpret these regulations. 
 23 
 
beneficiaries in its legislation and what it states as the guiding principles for LEADER. 
The author uses literature review and documentation analysis as the main data gathering 
methods for answering the first sub-question. The EU level intentions are identified 
based on LEADER literature review (Chapter 2.1 and 2.2). The review of the 
scholarship of LEADER implementation in the EU (Chapter 2.3), demonstrates the 
findings of other studies, in context of which the present study adds its contribution. To 
substantiate the findings from EU-level documentation analysis, an expert interview 
was conducted via Skype with Mr. Pedro Brosei, a former staff member of DG Agri 
working with LEADER and currently the vice-president of the European LEADER 
Association for Rural Development (ELARD). Interview questions (Appendix 3) were 
sent in advance to allow some preparation time. Also there was personal written 
communication, which can also be classified as an expert interview, between the author 
and Mrs Karolina Jasinska-Mühleck, a current member of staff of DG Agri working 
with LEADER, to specify some points on measuring the intentions of the EU. 
To answer the second sub-question „How is LEADER implemented at the local 
level?”, the author investigates the actual implementation of the programme in order to 
find out to what extent LAGs face restrictions. The description of LEADER 
implementation in Estonia is presented as a single case study (Chapter 3.2) to 
investigate the actual implementation of the programme. The gathered empirical data is 
used to measure the actual gap concerning the implementation of LEADER – that is the 
difference between the EU intentions and the extent to which the LAGs face 
restrictions. As the 2014-2020 programme period LEADER implementation is just 
beginning in Estonia – with the first projects being submitted to the LAGs in spring 
2016 – it has not been possible yet to ask about implementation related issues from the 
project beneficiaries directly. Instead, insight into the concerns voiced by LAGs is given 
and the study rather assesses the regulating framework for LAGs on deciding approval 
or rejection of projects.  
In order to answer the second sub-question the author first gathers empirical data 
from a collection of frequently asked questions (FAQ) by Estonian LAGs80 and the 
replies given by the Ministry of Rural Affairs, which is the Managing Authority (MA) 
for LEADER implementation and ARIB, which is the Paying Agency. Based on the 
                                                           




FAQ the author identifies two main categories of concern by LAGs a) those regarding 
project implementers (beneficiaries) and b) those concerning the operational 
mechanisms of the LAG when implementing the programme. To validate this initial 
identification of the main constraints faced by LAGs and to further substantiate these 
findings, a questionnaire consisting of eight questions (see Appendix 1) was designed 
and sent by e-mail to the managers of all the 26 LAGs in Estonia.81 The questionnaire 
included three open questions with regards to constraints imposed by regulative 
framework faced by LAGs in their day-to-day LEADER implementation as well as a 
closed question listing specific restrictions. The open questions allowed the respondents 
to freely name any restrictions – disregarding whether these derive from regulations set 
by the EU or by the national level. This approach enabled to check which restrictions 
are most salient. With the following closed question with pre-given answers, relevance 
of problems was measured by identifying how many LAGs see the constraint as a 
problem for their daily operations.82 Qualitative content analysis was used for the open 
questions to establish the relative salience of specific restrictions, which then was cross-
checked with the provided checklist of 17 restrictions.  The respondents had to give a 
reply (5 options on Likert scale) whether they find a specific requirement limiting to 
their day-to-day activities or not (see the results in Appendix 2). A threshold of 
exceeding 50% for categories “very limiting” and “somewhat limiting” was set by the 
author for considering, whether the respondents find the restriction as limiting or not.  
To answer the third sub-question “What additional restriction on the degree of 
autonomy is introduced by the national level?”, the author seeks to identify to what 
extent the national level regulates the functioning of the local level in LEADER 
implementation and what kind of restrictions are set. This is done analysing the 
legislation and documentation regulating LEADER implementation on Estonian state 
level (Chapter 3.3), and identifying the set limitations. As the regulation on LEADER 
                                                           
81Replies were received from 23 of them during time period April 20-May 06, 2016. 16 of the 
respondents have worked as managers for more than 5 years (most of them since the launch of the 
programme), 2 of them for 3-5 years and 5 of them for 0-2 years.  As the majority of the managers have 
worked for a long time with LEADER, they are expexted to be experienced with the programme. 
82Open questions (Question 1 and Question 2) were put at the beginning of the questionnaire to enquire 
information without imposing answers, which could induce bias. When relying on just a checklist 
composed by the author and not having open questions, some potential problems could be overlooked. 
Using a checklist as a second step (Question 3) helped to validate the initial answers from the open 
questions as well as to check against those restrictions the author had considered potentially most 
pertinent. A third open question, Question 8, asked for additional comments if there were any. 
 25 
 
implementation has implications on two levels - firstly requirements on the LAG as a 
local level actor (about its structure, setup, decision-making, etc) and secondly 
requirements on project applicant’s specific project activities (e.g. what kinds of things 
can actually be done in rural areas to promote RD, what kinds of costs are eligible for 
support), both aspects are identified as a result of documentation analysis. The main 
documents on the national level include the Partnership Agreement, the Implementing 
Act for CAP in Estonia, Estonian Rural Development Plan and the national level 
Regulation on LEADER by the Minister of Rural Affairs. With documentation analysis 
the author is aiming to measure the degree of autonomy given to the local level by these 
regulations in comparison with the EU legislation. 
As an added value, even though only complementary to the main research 
question, the author uses interviews to further elucidate why the national level has 
introduced some specific restrictions. This contributes to the present research, providing 
initial insights into the reasoning behind the additional restrictions introduced by the 
national level. As the rules set on national level follow on one hand from the legal room 
for manoeuvre they have, and just as importantly from their interests, it is needed to find 
out what the interests are to explain, why certain limitations have been introduced in 
Estonian national legislation. To get information on the reasons of the national level 
interventions, three semi-structured expert interviews are conducted – one at the Paying 
Agency (the Estonian Agricultural Registers and Information Board ARIB) and two at 
the MA (the Ministry of Rural Affairs)83. To reiterate, the limited number of 
interviews84 is due to their function as providing merely complementary information on 
the reasoning behind, whereas the introduction of additional restrictions as such was 
measured through documentation analysis. Thus documentation analysis and conducting 
interviews are the data gathering method used to measure the national level 
intervention, by which the national level is making the EU policy more restrictive.  
                                                           
83The interviewee at the ARIB was Mr Marek Treufedt, the head of the LEADER unit.  The interviewee 
first contacted at the MA was Mrs Anneli Kimmel, the head of the Local Initiative and Human 
Environment Bureau, dealing also with the LEADER programme. She recommended to conduct an 
interview also with Mr Marko Gorban, the head of the Rural Development Department, to get a wider 
perspective. The interviews were recorded, each taking about an hour and a half. Interview questions to 
these three interviewees (see Appendices 4, 5, 6) were sent in advance about a week before the interview, 
to allow adequate preparatory time to the respondents. 
84As also stated by Aunapuu-Lents in her research about the concentration of power and LEADER in 
Estonia „The small size of the country also leads to the concentration of specialist knowledge – by a 
limited number of individuals and in a few administrative positions.“ (Aunapuu-Lents, 2013) p 140 
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The limitations of the research include the thesis being a single case study in the 
sense that it focuses just on one funding programme, LEADER and on one country, 
Estonia. It does not provide a comparison of different programming periods, but 
provides an insight into the implementation conditions of LEADER at the start of the 
2014-2020 programming period. The consequences of these limitations are, that the 
research does not, and does not intend to, test the extent to which the strong 
involvement of the national level distorts the initial EU level intentions in, for example, 
programmes other than LEADER (e.g. in programmes that rely heavily on type I sub-
national actors) or in countries that are less centralized. Neither does the present 
research alone lead to generalizations, and does not claim to. The thesis rather provides 
an in-depth analysis of the Estonian case-study, which can be used as a starting point to 
carry out comparative analysis in the future and serve as the basis of more generalized 
findings about factors, which influence the MLG arrangement in different contexts. The 
research also has a practical value to it – it maps how many different restrictions there 
are and how restricting the LAGs find them. This poses a valuable analysis for Estonian 
national level (MA and Paying Agency) as well as the local level actors (LAGs). 
With the help of replying the sub-questions, the thesis aims to find an answer to 
the main research question “Why does the sub-national level have less autonomy for 
implementing LEADER than the supranational level has initially intended when 
devising this rural development policy?” The hypothesis thus is that the main 
intervening variable, decisive in determining the eventual form (i.e. the level of 
autonomy of the local level in policy implementation) of the governance arrangement, is 
the involvement of the national level. The chapters below, especially chapter 3, will 








2. LEADER as an approach of Community-led local development  
 
2.1 The concept and key features of LEADER 
 
LEADER is the EU’s bottom-up method for implementing RD policy85. It operates on 
the basis of two main principles: subsidiarity (decision-making taking place as close as 
possible to the site if implementation) and partnership (decision-making involving 
representatives from a wide range of governmental and non-governmental groups).86 
Since 1991 LEADER has worked as a laboratory in the form of a Community 
Initiative87. It was launched to improve the development potential of rural areas by 
making use of local initiative and skills, promoting the acquisition of know-how on 
local integrated development, and disseminating this know-how to other rural areas. The 
RD approaches tried out earlier were typically sectoral, focused mainly on farmers and 
aimed to support structural change within agriculture. They used top-down methods, 
where support schemes are decided at national or regional level. Therefore local 
stakeholders were not encouraged to obtain the skills needed to design the future of 
their own area. An area-based bottom-up approach involving local communities and 
aiming to add value to local resources, increasingly came to be seen as a new way of 
creating jobs and developing rural areas.88 The non-agricultural economy can become a 
way out of poverty for poor rural households.89 It is necessary to guide the local 
initiative in developing the local living and business environment towards finding 
solutions that are based on local resources and potential and meet the local needs.  
How LEADER works is that financial support is given to LAGs to implement 
their LDSs through giving grants to local projects.90 The share of EU territory in which 
the approach is being applied, the number of LAGs and the level of funding allocated to 
LEADER have increased substantially since the initiative was launched.91  
                                                           
85(European Court of Auditors, 2010) p 8 
86(Furmankiewicz, Macken-Walsh, & Stefanska, 2014) 
87(Thuesen A. A., 2010) p 33 
88(European Commission, 2006) p 6 
89(Winters, Essam, Zezza, Davis, & Carletto, 2010) p 649 
90(European Court of Auditors, 2010) p 8 
91(European Commission, 2006) p 6 
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The EC uses the term CLLD to describe “an approach that turns traditional “top-
down” development policy on its head”.92 Using the bottom-up approach is compatible 
with the principle of subsidiarity, which means that development decisions concerning 
local life are made at the lowest possible administrative level and thus closer to 
citizens.93 A local development approach like LEADER is seen as especially suitable 
for the promotion of RD because it is based on supporting local development initiatives 
on the ground, assuming that development needs, potential and resources are best 
known at the local level, hence to achieve best results in terms of RD, the local level 
should be granted as much autonomy in policy implementation as possible. 
Thus the main idea behind the LEADER approach is that, given the diversity of 
European rural areas, LDSs are more effective and efficient if decided and implemented 
at local level by local actors, accompanied by clear and transparent procedures and the 
support of the relevant public administrations94. This means that according to the EC, 
the idea behind implementing LEADER as a RD policy is to give as much autonomy as 
possible to the sub-national level and the role of the national level is rather seen as 
supporting the local level.  
The difference between LEADER and the more traditional rural policy measures 
is that it indicates how to proceed rather than what needs to be done. This is confirmed 
for example by a study done in Denmark, where according to focus group interviews the 
value of the LEADER approach is primarily related to empowering self-governing 
networks in a vertical MLG setting. The added value is seen in the implementation 
model itself rather than on what is specifically implemented (e.g. the LDS), and it 
relates to improved governance and improved results at the project level. 95 
Seven key features summarise the LEADER approach. It is important to consider 
them as a toolkit96. Each feature complements and interacts with the others throughout 
the entire policy implementation process, influencing the dynamics of rural areas and 
their ability to solve their problems. According to EC’s fact sheet97 on the LEADER 
approach, the key features are: 
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93(Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Estonia, 2014a) pp 166-167 
94(European Commission, 2006) p 8 
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96(European Commission, 2006) p 8 
97Ibid., pp 8-14 
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1) Area-based LDSs. An area-based approach takes a small, homogenous, socially 
cohesive territory, characterised by common traditions, a local identity, and a sense 
of belonging or common needs and expectations, as the target area for policy 
implementation. Being based on a specific area makes it easier to recognise the local 
strengths and weaknesses, threats and opportunities, endogenous potential as well as 
to identify the bottlenecks for local development. The positive effects of LEADER 
approach are likely to be found at the local territorial level, where the LAG operates 
as a supplement to the vertical governance system.98 Area-based essentially means 
local. This means that when the sub-national level is entitled autonomy, it is possible 
to tailor actions more precisely so that they would best meet the local needs.  
2) Bottom-up approach. This is the most distinctive feature of LEADER and it means 
that local actors participate in decision-making about their LDS and in the selection 
of the priorities to be followed in their local area. The bottom-up concept makes an 
expectation that LEADER is more able to involve the average citizen than other 
programmes.99 This again means that rural policies, to achieve best results, should be 
designed and implemented in the way best adapted to the needs of the communities 
they serve and this can be done if the local level is provided enough autonomy for 
policy implementation. 
3) Public–private partnerships. Setting up local partnerships – LAGs – is an important 
feature of the LEADER approach. A LAG is expected to associate public and private 
partners, including non-profit sector representatives, and represent the different local 
interest groups and socioeconomic sectors in its area. LAGs are implementing RD 
policy, deciding the direction and content of the LDS, and making the decisions on 
the different projects to be financed.  
4) Facilitating innovation. LEADER can play a valuable role in stimulating new and 
innovative approaches to RD. Innovation needs to be understood in a wide sense, e.g. 
a new product, a new process, a new organisation, a new market etc. Such innovation 
is encouraged by EC, expecting the local level to have adequate autonomy in policy 
implementation, which would allow LAGs adequate freedom and flexibility in 
making decisions about the local actions they want to support.  
                                                           
98(Thuesen & Nielsen, 2014) p 310 
99(Thuesen A. A., 2010) p 32 
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5) Integrated and multi-sectoral actions. LEADER is not a sectoral development 
programme, instead the LDS must integrate several sectors of activity and the actions 
and projects contained in the strategies should be linked and coordinated as a 
coherent whole. Links between the different economic, social, cultural, 
environmental players and sectors involved are an important part of the approach. 
6) Networking. This includes the exchange of experiences and know-how between 
LAGs, rural areas, administrations and organisations involved in all the levels of RD 
policy implementation. The types of institutional network are: a European network 
for RD (run by the EC)100 and a national rural network set up in each MS101. 
Networks of LAGs have also been set up at local, regional or national level in some 
MS (e.g. Estonian Leader Union102) and at European level (e.g. ELARD103). 
7) Cooperation. Cooperation goes further than networking, involving a LAG 
undertaking a joint project with another LAG, or with a group taking a similar 
approach, in another region, MS, or even third country. 
As demonstrated above through the 7 key features, the EC expects the LEADER 
approach to empower the local level and to provide it with such a level of autonomy in 
rural policy implementation, that the sub-national level could tailor its actions to best 
meet the local needs. LEADER has often been considered to be a “school case” for 
subsidiarity in Europe104. The EU level has left relatively open hands to the national 
level to decide on the specific requirements of the programme and the conditions set by 
the national legislation on LEADER implementation, thus the central government may 
considerably restrict and limit the sub-national level, thereby shaping the actual 
outcome of policy implementation. Of course, there is still the expectation from the EC 
level that the principles such as partnership and subsidiarity are adhered to, and in the 
specific case of LEADER there is the expectation from the EU side that the national 
level should operate within the spirit set on the supranational level and pass the logic 
downwards. 
                                                           
100For more information see (The European Network for Rural Development (ENRD)) 
https://enrd.ec.europa.eu/ 
101For more information on Estonian National Rural Network Support Unit see (Maamajanduse 
Infokeskus) http://www.maainfo.ee/ 
102For more information see (Eesti Leader Liit) http://leaderliit.eu/ 
103For more information see (European LEADER Association for Rural Development) 
http://www.elard.eu/ 
104(Berriet-Solliec et al., 2015) 
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2.2 A brief history of LEADER and its position in rural development policy 
 
Rural policy gained momentum as a specific European issue in 1998, when the EC 
communication “The future of rural society” was presented. Together with the 
simultaneous structural funds reform, this marks the starting point of a genuine RD 
policy in the EU.105 Promoting RD poses numerous policy and governance challenges 
as it requires co-ordination across sectors, across levels of government and between 
public and private actors.106 Even though there is no consensus among researchers with 
regard to exact details of an ideal RD approach, there are three fundamental principles 
upon which such an approach rests: decentralisation; participation and collective action; 
and devolution of managerial functions to communities. LEADER is a notable example 
of a rural policy measure following these principles.107   
In policy terms, LEADER was introduced as a Community Initiative financed 
under the EU Structural Funds108. There have been several generations of LEADER: 
LEADER I (1991–93), LEADER II (1994–99) and LEADER + (2000–06). During 
these periods, MS have had stand-alone LEADER programmes with separate financing 
set aside at the EU level109. During the 2007-2013 period the LEADER approach was 
mainstreamed and integrated within the overall EU RD policy, including LEADER as 
Axis 4110 in national and regional RDPs supported by the EU, alongside the other RD 
axes. This mainstreaming means that from being a special initiative, it became a 
measure integrated in the RDP and allocating funding to LEADER was made 
compulsory. 
LEADER sub-group111 made a conclusion after its first meeting112 of the 2014-
2020 programming period saying that LEADER is the only EU wide programme where 
local people both design their strategy and select projects. It raises a concern that 
                                                           
105(Copus & Dax, 2010) P 28 
106(OECD, 2014) p 3 
107(Falkowski, 2013) p 70 
108(European Court of Auditors, 2010) p 9 
109(European Commission, 2006) p 6 
110The objective of the ERDP axis 4 or the LEADER measure is to promote local initiative, contributing 
to the improvement of competitiveness of agriculture and forestry, of the environment and the 
countryside, and particularly to the improvement of the quality of life and to the diversification of 
economic activities, through mobilising the internal development potential of the rural area 
111Rural Networks’ Assembly’s permanent sub-group LEADER and community led local development, 
set up according to (Commission Implementing Decision 2014/825/EU, 2014) 
112(European Rural Networks' Assembly, 2015) p 16 
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mainstreaming LEADER unfortunately did not mean a broader application of the 
LEADER principles, but rather that LEADER had to follow the implementation 
methods and practices of other measures and Axes. According an employee of DG Agri, 
the regulation 1698/2005 article 64113 which guided LEADER implementation during 
2007-2013 was misinterpreted by many MS. She states  
 
From my observation, in the last period many restrictions were due to an unnecessary 
limitation of LEADER activities what has been offered under standard rural development 
measures. LAGs were therefore bound to some types of activities only and often could 
not address the actually identified local needs.114  
 
This means that even though the intention of the EC had been to widen the positive 
experiences of LEADER by making using LEADER approach compulsory in RDPs, 
then what happened was that the national level, in many cases, did not offer the freedom 
provided for LEADER but instead limited its implementation to standard RDP measures 
thus limiting the autonomy of the local level. 
The EU’s RD policy, known as the second pillar of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP), has been improved for the 2014-2020 period through wider CAP reform. 
The policy will be implemented through RDPs which are done for a seven year period. 
MS have put together their RDPs based upon at least four of the six common EU 
priorities. LEADER is expected to contribute especially to the 6th priority, which is 
promoting social inclusion, poverty reduction and economic development in rural 
areas.115 According to an EU regulation on support for RD for the 2014-2020 period 
 
The LEADER approach for local development has, over a number of years, proven its 
effectiveness in promoting the development of rural areas by fully taking into account the 
multi-sectoral needs for endogenous rural development through its bottom-up approach. 
LEADER should therefore be continued in the future and its application should remain 
compulsory for rural development programmes at national and/or regional level.116 
 
When looking at the wider policy and governance context in the EU during the past 15 
years, we can see that the EC has continuously encouraged empowerment of the local 
                                                           
113(Council of the European Union, 2005) 
114Personal communication with (Jasinska-Mühleck, 2016)  
115See the Rural development 2014-2020 section on the EC website for the priorities (European 
Commission) http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rural-development-2014-2020/index_en.htm 
116(European Parliament and of the Council, 2013) 
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level both in policy formulation as well as implementation. EC’s White Paper on 
European Governance from 2001 proposes opening up the policy-making process to get 
wider involvement in shaping and delivering EU policy. The aim is to establish more 
democratic governance and the principle of participation117 is considered especially 
important for this. The paper acknowledges that participation crucially depends on 
central governments following an inclusive approach when developing and 
implementing EU policies118 and admits that in a MLG arrangement the real challenge 
is to establish clear rules for how competence is shared, not separated.119 
In 2009, the Committee of the Regions issued a White Paper on MLG where it 
considers MLG to mean “coordinated action by the European Union, the Member States 
and local and regional authorities, based on partnership and aimed at drawing up and 
implementing EU policies.”120 This means that responsibility should be shared between 
the different tiers of government concerned. In its follow-up opinion121 the Committee 
states that establishment of a MLG framework is crucial for the successful 
reformulation of the CAP after 2013 to ensure adequate involvement of the local 
level.122 Also the Council of European Municipalities and Regions expresses its strong 
support to integrated development at the sub-regional level based on a bottom-up 
methodology based on local partnerships.123 The new rural paradigm conceptualized by 
the OECD in 2006 also stresses the need for increased use of partnerships in policy 
implementation124. However, it can be argued that the new rural paradigm (moving to a 
holistic set of policies, focusing on places and cohesion, and involving MLG and 
various stakeholders) has not really taken place yet, because of limited funding 
available for this125. So far LEADER can be considered the biggest supporter of such a 
development approach empowering the local level in RD policy implementation, 
enabling to achieve results that best meet the local needs. 
 
                                                           
117According to the White Paper the five principles that underpin good governance are openness, 
participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence.  
118(European Commission, 2001) p 7 
119Ibid., p 29 
120(Committee of the Regions, 2009) p 1 
121Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on ‘building a European culture of multilevel governance: 
follow-up to the Committee of the Regions’ White Paper’ 
122(Committee of the Regions, 2012) p 69 
123(Council of European Municipalities and Regions, 2010) p 1 
124(OECD, 2006) 
125(Kull, Voutilainen, Christopoulos, & Reimets, 2014) p 73 
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2.3 Review of the scholarship of LEADER implementation in the EU 
 
In this sub-chapter the author introduces some of the findings of research done on 
LEADER and MLG in European countries126 such as Finland, Denmark, Austria, 
England, Ireland, France, Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic. Emphasis is set on 
the aspects regarding the autonomy of the local level in policy implementation and how 
this has changed over the years as a result of mainstreaming the programme from being 
a Community Initiative to being a part of RDPs. Rules and restrictions are covered from 
two aspects – those concerning the functioning and operations of the LAGs and those 
concerning project activities and costs. 
Mainstreaming of LEADER, which resulted in its incorporation into the RDPs, 
has been criticized by interest groups because they feel that LEADER as an approach 
has become marginalised. The current perceptions of the programme do not correspond 
any more with the understanding of a bottom-up programme.127 Adshead in her case 
study about Ireland states: “Notwithstanding EU desires to promote the role of sub-
national actors and sub-national policy capacities, Irish regionalization was superficial 
and the state remains a highly centralized one. This reaffirms the view of the state as 
‘gate-keeper’ to EU influence.”128 Furmankiewicz in his case study on Poland reports 
problems that are at variance with the aims of the LEADER initiative, including 
“unwillingness of public authorities to transfer responsibilities to LAGs.”129 The study 
brings out that the national level officials doubted if LAGs were capable of using the 
public funds in accordance with the state level’s understanding of agricultural 
development and public finance rules. Therefore the rules of LEADER pilot programme 
were shaped in a way to prioritize the utilisation of funds and minimise the potential 
problems. The study also makes a reference to the Czech Republic where civil servants 
had applied the EU rules more strictly by adding national rules to LEADER.130 As can 
be seen from the examples of literature above, the national level wants to retain its role 
as a firm gate-keeper and introduces additional national rules to LEADER, based on its 
own interests. 
                                                           
126For a good overview on LEADER-literature see Table 2 in: (Pollerman, Raue, & Schnaut, 2014a) p 12 
127(Thuesen A. A., 2013) p 2 
128(Adshead, 2014) p 428 
129(Furmankiewicz, 2012) p 262 
130Ibid., p 270 
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For years LEADER has been known for being non-bureaucratic and experimental. 
It used to function as a laboratory for experimenting with new innovative solutions131 to 
RD challenges. The EU storytelling regarding the LEADER methodology and the seven 
key concepts is one reason why LEADER became known for its non-bureaucratic 
character. But now this narrative appears to conflict with the perception of local level, 
who sees LEADER as becoming bureaucratic132. The actors do not feel any longer that 
adequate autonomy is given to the local level for the implementation of the policy. Case 
study findings from Austria and Ireland regarding the mainstreaming of LEADER 
conclude: “Although the principles of Leader have not been removed, their relevance 
has been restricted.”133 A paper on RD in England states: “...there was a feeling that the 
selection of measures against which projects could be funded, decided by RDAs 
[Regional Development Agencies] at the outset, presented a top-down restriction that 
precluded true local control.”134 It can be summarized that as a result of mainstreaming, 
LEADER has ceased to be a non-bureaucratic and innovative programme and fulfilment 
of LEADER principles is being restricted because of top-down restrictions. 
In the evaluation of the RD programmes in Germany135 it has been found that 
there is no need to set narrow limits for LAG size, actors at local level should be able to 
decide on the size of the LAG themselves, as being small does not mean the LAG is not 
capable. Also a research concentrating on administration systems and RDP 
implementation in France, Germany and Italy136 identified that to be able to fully meet 
the bottom-up principle and offer best solutions to local needs, the local stakeholders 
need to act in a region they know well. Thus it is important that the size of the region is 
not too big, otherwise there is risk that it will be too far away from the local level. The 
study137 also brings out that there are cases when territorial control games by national 
authorities tend to reproduce a territorial order where public policy is taking shape in 
spaces defined a priori (e.g. districts etc). In these situations the defence of institutional 
territory becomes the dominant logic of action and may hinder local initiatives. This is a 
danger that could be happening in Estonia when the administrative reform takes place. 
                                                           
131For a discussion on LEADER and innovation see (Dargan & Shucksmith, 2008) 
132
 (Thuesen A. A., 2013) p 17, 20 
133(Dax, Strahl, Kirwan, & Maye, 2016) p 65 
134(Bosworth, et al., 2013) 
135(Pollerman, Raue, & Schnaut, 2013) 




A study on local government reorganisation in the UK has highlighted an additional 
factor: “Indeed, we saw how...the objects of governance that were promoted following 
local government reorganisation differed markedly from those pursued before...”138 It 
can be concluded that the size and set-up of a LAG should not be regulated by top-down 
restrictions, but the local level itself should have the autonomy to decide this, as to best 
meet the needs of the local community. 
LEADER attaches importance to LAG’s long-term abilities to build social capital 
and institutional capacity139 in the partnership. Thus an excessively bureaucratic 
approach in regulating the structure, operations and decision-making of a LAG is not 
appropriate, as it directly influences the social capital as well as institutional capacity.  
According to Thuesen, the organizational model of a partnership also has a direct link to 
the issue of legitimacy. This is especially relevant as LAGs distribute public money 
based on their LDSs. When access to the LAG is free and anyone can become a member 
as well as influence the decisions taken within the LAG, e.g. decide on who gets to be 
elected on the board, it reflects a high expression of input legitimacy.140 Yet it is only 
those members appearing at the general assembly meeting who decide who gets elected 
on the board141 and in case there are further limitations, this additionally limits the 
actual degree of participation in the decision making process. There can be national 
level requirements on the composition of the LAG members or board members – e.g. 
necessary representation of specific sectors (e.g. a certain percentage of private persons 
or limited participation of public authorities). Respondents from Danish LAGs felt that 
the independence of the boards was not always respected. They felt there were tight 
regulations affecting LAGs and as a result they perceived political framing142. If board 
members feel disempowered, they may leave. Public authorities should hold a special 
responsibility for keeping board members engaged, because they make a voluntary 
commitment to improving RD through their participation in LEADER. National level 
legislation, e.g. demanding rotation of board members, definitely does not encourage 
                                                           
138(Pemberton & Goodwin, 2010) p 282 
139For a discussion on social capital in LEADER see (Nardone, Sisto, & Lopolito, 2010) and for a 
discussion on building institutional capacity see (Scott, 2004) 
140(Thuesen A. A., 2011) p 578 
141Ibid., p 580 
142(Thuesen A. A., 2013) p 15 
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that.143 Also research carried out in Finland has highlighted that the tripartition rule 
(having representatives of three sectors) combined with the new regulation 
(“ultimatum”, as the Finnish LAGs call it) limiting the LAG board members’ “term of 
office” not to exceed more than six years successively resulted in the need to change 
almost all of the experienced board members. This restriction is seen as an 
incomprehensible bureaucratic hindrance by the Finnish LAGs. As a result the general 
meeting needs careful preparation work and to meet the required criteria the suggested 
board members are likely to be elected and no changes proposed. A Finnish interviewee 
stated “Rather than a real one, the election of a LAG board seemed like a symbolic act 
of local control or democratic accountability. Or, it could be seen as a ritual that was 
performed in order to secure a rural development budget...to the region.”144 Also the 
case study of Wales criticizes the rule of equal “three-thirds” representation: “Despite 
the good intentions, however, attempts at achieving equal representation through the 
inclusion of equal numbers of people or organisations from each of the different sectors, 
proved overly simplistic. Such a measure cannot secure equality in the partnership 
process itself.”145 Based on these case-studies it can be concluded that LAGs face 
considerable restrictions to their every-day activities because of different top-down 
regulations regulating their membership structure, operations and decision-making. This 
has a negative influence on the social capital as well as institutional capacity of LAGs 
as disempowered actors like board members, feel dismotivated and are likely to leave.   
As can be seen from the case studies above, even if a LAGs is legally free to make 
a decision according to its own will, wrong kinds of decisions can cause sanctions on 
behalf of the national level, because the LAG would not meet the criteria introduced by 
the national legislation. It can be observed that regulations pay more and more attention 
on regulating input-related legitimacy, but it should not be forgotten that the essence of 
the LEADER programme, as intended from the EU level, is that of output-oriented 
legitimacy, i.e.  the problem-solving capacity of the LAG.146 This means that decisions 
are legitimate when they serve the people and this is the reason why in the first place the 
local level was intended by the EU level to have relatively large autonomy - because it 
                                                           
143(Thuesen A. A., 2013) p 22 
144(Nousiainen & Mäkinen, 2015) p 216 
145(Derkzen, Franklin, & Bock, 2008) p 459 
146(Thuesen A. A., 2011) p 578 
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is reasonable to delegate decisions to experts and network actors as these groups 
provide better results in rural policy implementation. This directly links to the autonomy 
of the local level to decide on what kind of activities it wants to fund under its LDS. 
Despite the emphasis of local empowerment, EAFRD and the national RDPs set 
the guidelines on what the LEADER LDSs should deal with and also set detailed rules 
on how the money can be spent.147 Yet LEADER interventions, even in local terms, 
represent rather minor commitments of public money and therefore could be cast as an 
experiment.148 In Mecklenburg-Vorpommern a measure LEADERalternativ has been 
introduced149, providing funding for projects that contribute to the LDSs, without 
further restrictions concerning the content, i.e. the activities that are done. Whether an 
idea is eligible for funding or not should depend mainly on whether it fits the targets of 
the LDSs composed by the LAGs themselves, meaning that the local level should have 
the autonomy to select, which activities best meet the needs identified in their LDS.  
A study done in Germany150 concludes that to be able to use the original and 
intended strengths of the LEADER approach, a more flexible funding structure, which 
is oriented on the goals of the local level, is recommended as in the 2007-2013 funding 
period limited bottom-up participation and lack of innovation are prevalent. It is stated 
that top-down influence from central government institutions is a factor that weakens 
the possibility of participation and this brings around a danger – loss of motivation by 
civil society actors to participate in decisions about projects because of restricted 
funding conditions. Lack of possibilities to fund innovative projects, and other obstacles 
in the form of restrictive rules, creating the feeling of a general climate of mistrust, are 
likely to lead to loss of confidence and de-motivation of actors. If there are 
deteriorations in funding conditions some LAGs become dissatisfied and don’t engage 
any more151. Also a study on LEADER implementation in Ireland and Austria has 
concluded that “rigid co-ordination structures and hierarchical mindsets, as well as new 
control and audit mechanisms [...] prevent a local [...] application of Leader. The 
hierarchical administrative structures thus work against [...] multi-level governance.”152  
                                                           
147(Nousiainen & Mäkinen, 2015) p 213 
148(Zago, 2014) p 9 
149(Pollermann, Raue, & Schnaut, 2014b) p 135 
150(Pollermann, Raue, & Schnaut, 2014b)  
151(Berriet-Solliec et al., 2015) p 20 
152(Dax, Strahl, Kirwan, & Maye, 2016) p 66 
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What is relevant for MLG here is the complexity of local realities. With examples 
from LEADER implementation, we have seen how good initial intentions and 
seemingly democratic practices may reveal multifaceted when examined at the practical 
implementation level of every day. To understand the influence and consequences of a 
regulation at the every-day level of LAG’s functioning, it is necessary to be in constant 
communication with the local actors.153 This once more emphasizes the need to trust the 
local level and give them adequate autonomy as they, being close to the grassroots, are 
experts on the local needs, resources and possibilities and the ones responsible for the 
everyday implementation of the policy. It also makes it especially relevant to include 
the local level already in the policy formulation process, as this would enable to avoid 
problems in the further, policy implementation stage. 
As we can see from the literature review above, top-down restrictions have been 
faced by the LAGs in the majority of case-studies, either on the structure and operations 
of the LAG or on project activities. However, it has not been in focus, from where these 
restrictions come from – whether it is an EU or national level regulation, which is the 
focus of the present study. Another gap identified is that the case-studies have 
concentrated on a limited number of restrictions – e.g. those regulating the size and 
setup of a LAG, those regulating the board and decision-making, those limiting 
innovation. The original contribution of the author in the present research is to fill these 
gaps by making a distinct differentiation between EU level and national level 
requirements and making a comprehensive list of additional restrictions faced by 
Estonian LAGs at the start of the 2014-2020 programming period. This enables to 
provide a more comprehensive picture on how the simultaneous application of different 
requirements affects the actual daily functioning of a LAG. 
  
                                                           
153(Nousiainen & Mäkinen, 2015) p 216 
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3. The case study of implementation of CLLD and LEADER in Estonia 
 
In this chapter, section 3.1 will present the legal framework for implementing CLLD 
and LEADER in the EU, thus further substantiating (in addition to that provided in 
Chapter 2) the answer to the first sub-question on EU level intentions with regard to the 
degree of local level autonomy. Section 3.2 will give background information and a 
brief history of LEADER implementation in Estonia since the first LAGs were set up in 
2006 and also provides insights into the concerns voiced by LAGs about the restrictions 
faced by them as well as by the project beneficiaries in LEADER implementation at the 
doorstep of the current, 2014-2020 programming period, thus replying to the second 
sub-question.  Section 3.3 will demonstrate what are the national level requirements set 
on LEADER complemented by, even though not central to this research, why some 
specific restrictions have been introduced in national regulation, thus replying to the 
third sub-question of the thesis. With the help of this chapter, the main research 
question of the thesis is answered. 
 
3.1 Legal framework for implementing CLLD and LEADER in the EU during the 
2014-2020 programming period 
 
In this section the author will provide information about the EU level legal framework 
by identifying to what extent the EU regulates the functioning of LAGs and the eligible 
activities of project beneficiaries, indicating what kind of requirements are set. Together 
with findings from the second chapter it is possible to establish, which the initial 
intentions were and what kind of degree of autonomy was intended to be given to the 
local level in order to realize the aims pursued by the supranational level when 
formulating the governance arrangement. The intended autonomy is thus measured by 
what the EU sets as limitations concerning the LAGs and the project applicants and 
what it sees as the guiding principles of LEADER. 
The EU established its general intentions for LEADER implementation through 
the seven principles, which were described in Chapter 2.1. These principles have 
remained the same from programming period to programming period, since the 
initiative was first established. There are two main legislative documents regulating 
LEADER local development on EU level during the 2014-2020 programming period 
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according to Commission’s LEADER guidance fiche154 – Articles 32-35 of Regulation 
(EU) 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Common Provision 
Regulation – CPR) and Articles 42-44 of Regulation (EU) 1305/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council (EAFRD). LEADER measure fiche is a guidance 
document to interpret the above mentioned regulations. It does not represent a binding 
legal interpretation, but helps to explain the intentions of the EU level for LEADER 
implementation. This means that the document is also meant as a guide to anyone who 
is applying the policy, e.g. the programme managing authority at the national level. 
The fact that the EU level does not overly regulate LEADER is seen from the fact 
that there are just 4 articles about it in regulation 1303/2013 and 3 articles in regulation 
1305/2013. More detailed information about what these articles cover is provided on the 
following pages. The intention of the EU to give autonomy and freedom for LEADER 
implementation becomes explicitly clear from the measure fiche, which states that 
“individual operations shall be eligible if they contribute to achieving the objectives of 
the local development strategy and correspond to the objectives and priorities indicated 
for support under LEADER in the PA and RDP. Consequently, the LDS should be the 
main criterion to assess the eligibility of LEADER projects...”155 Hence it is the 
understanding of the EU level, that it is the LAG on the local level, which in its  LDS 
should identify the activities it wants the project applicants to do with LEADER money 
to best meet the local needs. This means that the EU sees a high degree of local level 
autonomy as an important precondition of LEADER implementation. 
The intentions of the EU level become clear also from the report of European 
Court of Auditors. The report states: “Fundamental to Leader is the bottom-up 
identification of local solutions to local problems, yet all but one of the managing 
authorities audited have imposed a de facto top-down system for the 2017 – 13 
period.”156  We see again that a high degree of local autonomy is instrumental to meet 
the intentions of EU set on this policy. The report first makes observations about LAGs’ 
implementation of the seven LEADER features to achieve added value, and only then 
observations about the soundness of financial management, which demonstrates how 
important the EU level considers these key features to be.  
                                                           
154(European Commission, 2014) p 1 
155Ibid., p 4 




The CPR lays down the common provisions of the five ESI Funds. Article 32 of the 
regulation makes it obligatory for the agricultural fund (EAFRD) to support CLLD, but 
for the other ESI funds it is just a possibility, not an obligation157. This means that in 
RD, CLLD is compulsory and it is implemented in the form of the LEADER approach, 
which is integrated into the RDP. The article further sets the essence of CLLD to be158: 
• focused on specific sub-regional areas (i.e. the operational territory of a LAG) 
• led by LAGs composed of public and private interest groups’ representatives, in 
which, at the decision-making level neither public authorities nor any single 
interest group can represent more than 49 % of the voting rights;  
• carried out through integrated and multi-sectoral area-based LDSs 
• designed based on local needs and potential, and include innovative features in 
the local context, networking and cooperation. 
Article 33 of the regulation states the 7 elements, which a CLLD strategy (and hence in 
case of LEADER, the LDS of a LAG) must at least contain. Article 33 also states that 
the population of the area covered by the strategy (in case of LEADER, the population 
of the LAG) shall not be less than 10 000 and not more than 150 000 inhabitants, 
however exceptions are allowed in duly justified cases. This shows that having a 
relatively small scale for the size of a LAG, the EU aims the sub-regional level to be as 
close as possible to the grassroots level, which will enable to best address local needs. 
Article 34 states that LAGs shall design and implement the CLLD strategies and 
sets a list of 7 tasks which LAGs need to perform. One of the tasks is to draw up a non-
discriminatory and transparent selection procedure and objective criteria for the 
selection of operations, avoiding conflicts of interest as well as to ensure coherence with 
its strategy when selecting and prioritising operations. Thus the EU level intends to 
provide the LAGs with enough autonomy as to decide, how to best avoid conflict of 
interests and to select the projects which are best in line with its strategy. 
Article 35 lists the cost items which support from the ESI Funds shall cover. 
Among these are also “implementation of operations under the CLLD strategy”, which 
in case of LEADER means the costs done by project applicants to implement a  project. 
                                                           
157(European Parliament and of the Council, 2013) 
158(European Commission, 2014) p 1 
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The regulation does not limit the activities which can be done within the projects by 
applicants, as long as they are in line with the general aims of the policy, which 
demonstrates the intention of the European level to leave autonomy for the local level. 
The supranational level intends to give freedom to the local level to decide, which 
activities should be supported under projects to best address the local needs identified in 
the LDS. A limit is set to the support of running and animation costs; these shall not 
exceed 25% of the total public expenditure incurred within the CLLD. For LEADER 
this means that a LAG has to use at least 75% of the total public expenditure for funding 
projects and up to 25% can be used by the LAG itself for its administration costs. 
 
Regulation 1305/2013 
Regulation 1305/2013159 regulates RD by EAFRD and acknowledges that the LEADER 
approach has proven its effectiveness in promoting RD by fully taking into account the 
multi-sectoral needs for endogenous RD through its bottom-up approach. Therefore 
LEADER should be continued and be compulsory for RDPs. The LEADER section at 
the end of the regulation’s RD support measures’ chapter is composed of three articles. 
Article 42 states that in addition to the tasks referred to in Article 34 of CPR, LAGs 
may also perform additional tasks delegated to them by the MA and/or the Paying 
Agency. Co-operation activities of LAGs are regulated in Article 44. The regulation 
does not limit the activities of project beneficiaries, which demonstrates the intention of 
the EU level to leave autonomy for the local level to make this decision. Taking the EU 
level’s strong emphasis on the bottom-up, LAG-driven approach and the absence of 
restrictions with regard to project activities, it can be inferred that in LEADER as a RD 
governance arrangement the EU considers it desirable for the achievement of its goals 
to grant a relatively high degree of freedom to the local level.  
Thus the EU level intends the local level to have considerable autonomy in 
LEADER governance. It expects the national level not to intervene excessively in the 
projects’ implementation phase. Moreover, it explicitly expects the MS to adhere to 
these principles, when stating in the fiche: „MS are invited to offer to LAGs a large 
scope of action and avoid listing eligible types of operation.“160 
 
                                                           
159(European Parliament and of the Council, 2013) 
160(European Commission, 2014) p 5 
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3.2 LEADER implementation in Estonia 
 
Sub-chapter 3.2 will address the second sub-question on how LEADER is actually 
being implemented on the local level in Estonia. The author will begin this section by 
providing a brief historical overview of the LEADER programme implementation since 
the establishment of the first LAGs in 2006 and will conclude with providing initial 
insight into the concerns voiced by LAGs on the restrictions faced by them as well as 
the project beneficiaries at the doorstep of the current, 2014-2020 programming period.  
 
LEADER in Estonia 2000-2006 
In Estonia, LEADER was not applied immediately as a programme but as one measure 
of the National Development Plan (NDP) in the pilot period. Its administration was 
simplified compared to the LEADER programme but the principles the same.161 The 
NDP for 2004-2006162 included a LEADER-type measure (Measure 3.6) for “Local 
Initiative based Development Projects – LEADER”. The conditions for the measure 
were constituted and signed by the Minister of Agriculture in June 2006. Preceding the 
official LAGs, in the framework of The Baltic Rural Partnerships Program, there were 
three partnerships established in South-Eastern Estonia counties Põlva, Valga and Võru 
during 2000-2003. The Partnerships were functioning on the same principles as 
LAGs.163 When Measure 3.6 opened, 24 LAGs applied for support to prepare strategies 
to be able to start to implement them under the RDP164.  
 
LEADER in Estonia 2007-2013 
During the 2007-2013 programming period LEADER was designed as a separate 
methodological axis of RDP165 which, apart from serving its overall purposes of 
improving local governance and mobilising endogenous potential of rural areas, 
contributed to the priorities of axis 1, 2 or 3166. During the 2007-2013 period there were 
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162(Ministry of Finance, 2004) pp 191-193 
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165(Põllumajandusministeerium, 2014a) p 222 
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 Axis 1 is Improving the competitiveness of the agricultural and forestry sector, Axis 2 is Improving 
the environment and the countryside, Axis 3 is Quality of life in rural area and diversification of the rural 




26 LAGs operating in Estonia and according to the RDP monitoring report for 2014167, 
the progress of LEADER measure has been very good, because all the set output 
indicator levels have been achieved and in many cases also surpassed. The results of 
empirical analysis on the implementation of LEADER in Estonia (2009-2011 1st 
quarter)168 reveal that in general, the territorial character of the implementation of 
LEADER programme in Estonia has positive impacts on regional development.  As to 
the whole Estonian area eligible for support, only three eligible rural municipalities 
have not yet joined the LEADER groups.169 EC set 11 evaluation questions to measure 
the effectiveness and impact of LEADER measure in rural areas. Based on the 
evaluation survey (2007-2013) it can be concluded that LEADER approach has 
contributed to better governance in rural areas, multisectoral approach and promotion of 
co-operation, increased LAGs’ and other partners’ capabilities and the biggest benefit 
has been activating the third sector and promoting local culture and improving local 
environment for the local people.170 This means that with a decade of LEADER 
experience in Estonia, the recently begun period is expected to continue in the same 
spirit, providing best solutions for each LAG, identified based on the local needs. 
 
CLLD and LEADER in Estonia 2014-2020 
The first strategic choices for CLLD, including LEADER as regards RD, are set out by 
the MS in the Partnership Agreement (PA). The PA indicates the main objectives and 
priorities for CLLD in the MS.171 EC approved in June 2014 the PA for European 
Structural and Investment Funds (ESI funds)172 submitted by Estonian Government. The 
strategic focus throughout the PA is contributing to EU2020 and its national level 
counterpart National Reform Programme Estonia 2020 objectives with ESI funds. 
Operational programmes (OP) are composed on the basis of the PA and they define 
more fund-specific objectives and results, financing plan and describe the measures to 
                                                           
167(Põllumajandusministeerium, 2015b) 
168(Geomedia OÜ, 2011) 
169(Ernst & Young, 2010b) p 11 
170(Eesti Maaülikool, 2015) pp 19-20 
171(European Commission, 2014) p 3 
172ESI Funds (the European Structural and Investment Funds) -  Funds providing support under cohesion 
policy, namely the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF) and 
the Cohesion Fund, the Fund for rural development, namely the European Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development (EAFRD), and the Fund for the maritime and fisheries sector, namely measures financed 
under shared management in the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) 
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achieve the objectives. Estonia composed one common OP programme for Cohesion 
Policy Funds (ESF, ERDF, CF) for 2014-2020 and there are separate OPs composed for 
EAFRD and EMFF.173 RDP is the operational programme for EAFRD. 
According to the PA, strong local communities and social inclusion of residents 
are an important prerequisite of RD. Therefore, the LEADER approach will be 
continued, as one of its main advantages compared to national approaches is the 
principle of decision-making closer to local residents and better accommodation of local 
and regional conditions in the provision of support.174 Despite good words being said in 
the PA about the LEADER approach, the description of arrangements to ensure an 
integrated approach to the use of the ESI Funds admits that most of the interventions 
will be nationwide in nature.  This indicates that the national level attempts to impose 
its national level priorities, instead of allowing local ones specific to each LAG. Hence 
the Cohesion Policy Funds OP does not include implementation of LEADER-
approach175, stating CLLD “non-applicable”.176 This gives an initial indication of the 
role of the state as a firm gate-keeper, wanting to remain in control and refusing to let 
the local level on the playground. 
The setting for LEADER, established in the RDP, has to be consistent with and 
complementary to the strategic choices made for CLLD. RDP specifies the relating 
focus areas to which LEADER could potentially contribute in addition to the area 6b177 
under which LEADER is automatically programmed. The LDSS of LAGs will have to 
contribute to the focus areas identified for the implementation of LEADER. In order to 
allow for a transparent monitoring of the RDP, LEADER is programmed as a separate 
measure, but being a method used for RD on the local level, its scope covers in 
principle all the instruments supported by the EAFRD.178 This means that even though 
expected to contribute to a specific objective and focus area, the activities to be 
supported under LEADER are meant to be left free. 
                                                           
173(Ministry of Finance) http://www.struktuurifondid.ee/programming-2014-2020/ 
174(Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Estonia, 2014a) p 69 
175
 According to an interview with MA representative (Gorban, 2016), the reason is most likely the 
difficult implementation arrangement of the approach 
176(Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Estonia, 2014b) p 182 
177Priority 6: Promoting social inclusion, poverty reduction and the rural economic development, focus 
area 6 b: local development 
178(European Commission, 2014) p 3 
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The Estonian RDP was formally adopted by the EC in February 2015. It outlines 
Estonia's priorities for using € 993 million of public funding (€ 823 million from the EU 
budget and € 169 million of national funding).  According to the EC’s Factsheet on 
Estonian 2014-2020 RD Programme, Estonia will continue its successful LEADER 
approach implementation with 99% of the rural population covered by LDSs and 
LEADER is one of the five most important RDP measures in budgetary terms.179  
Estonia provided 85.8 million EUR in funding for LEADER during the period 
2007–2013180 and the RDP foresees 90 million this period, which counts to 9,1% of the 
RDP budget, exceeding the minimum allocation almost two times181 which shows how 
important this approach is considered to be182. In spring 2014 there were difficult RDP 
budget negotiations, and also LEADER budget was on the agenda. Members of the 
RDP preparatory steering committee were prevailingly on opinion183 that pressure on 
LEADER will be big (e.g. other ministries see it as a fund from where to get money e.g. 
for voluntary rescue, last-mile broadband, heritage conservation). As RDP will no 
longer have the village development measure (which was the main measure from where 
investments for community development were made), it is advisable to avoid budget 
cuts in LEADER and to encourage other funds in addition to EAFRD to foresee special 
measures that allocate resources to LAGs.  With respect to the degree of autonomy 
given to the local level this shows that the state level is pursuing its own interests (e.g. 
to find a solution to create the last mile connections for the general broadband network 
already made with another investment programme) and tries to influence a policy to fit 
its national level goals. This means that with the LEADER measure the national level is 
attempting to instrumentalize the local level for its own purposes, which are not 
necessarily the same as the LAGs might have, given that they do not have the same 
goals as the national level does. Also the European level sees this intervening act of the 
national level, this being demonstrated in the EC’s Factsheet on 2014-2020 RDP for 
Estonia, stating about LEADER LAGs:  “The groups set their priorities independently 
of government, but it is expected that village development will be a priority as no 
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specific village development measure is foreseen”.184 By not introducing the village 
development measure separately, the national level is expecting that it can shape the 
policy in a way that meets its own ends, thus it is not entirely bottom-up or based on 
locally identified needs, but rather driven by the national level’s budget constraints. 
At the first glance, the bottom-up principle and local empowerment have been 
taken seriously in the implementation of the LEADER approach in Estonia. All the 26 
LAGs are legally registered non-profit associations, composed of representatives of 3 
sectors (local authorities, enterprises and NGOs) and membership in the association is 
open – anyone can become a member. To facilitate inclusiveness, the state may 
sometimes have to play certain activist roles, e.g. enabling mobilization of people in 
local participatory development.185 The requirement to have representatives of 3 sectors 
– public, private and non-profit represented in LAG membership is an example of this 
facilitation. The aim is to improve the opportunities for participation and voice, as the 
logic behind decentralization is about making governance at the local level more 
responsive to the felt needs of the large majority of the population.  
Each LAG, based on a LDS composed for its operating area, receives a budget 
from the MA to implement it. Depending on the size and population of the LAG as well 
as some socio-economic criteria, the budgets vary from ca 2.4 to 5.7 million EUR for 
the programming period. The executive body of the LAG is the board, elected by LAG 
members at the general meeting (annual assembly). In principle, any citizen living in the 
LAG area can become a member and consequently get elected on the board.  
 
Concerns voiced by LAGs about 2014-2020 LEADER implementation  
At the start of the new programming period, the LAGs in Estonia have raised different 
concerns with regard to their degree of autonomy in policy implementation. With the 
assistance of The Rural Economy Research Centre (a state agency administrated by the 
MA, i.e. the Estonian Ministry of Rural Affairs), which operates as the Estonian 
National Rural Network, these concerns have been collected into a database of 
frequently asked questions186.  It is a collection of questions (50 questions as of March 
23, 2016), based on the challenges faced by the LAGs at the start of the 2014-2020 
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programming period. In general, the questions can be divided into two categories – the 
ones concerning the activities of project applicants (the actual project implementation 
level) and the ones concerning the operational mechanisms of the LAG. To validate the 
initial indication of main constraints and to further substantiate the findings, a survey 
among Estonian LAGs was carried out to identify which constraints are faced and 
which of them are found most restrictive by LAGs. Below six biggest constraints (those 
found restrictive by more than 50% of respondents) are discussed in detail, to provide 
examples which touch upon the issue of local level degree of autonomy in the LEADER 
governance arrangement. 
 
Concerns on project beneficiary level 
One of the main concerns of the LAGs on the project beneficiary level is about the 
implementation and eligibility of soft projects, i.e. non-investment projects submitted to 
the LAG. There is great confusion on the actual project implementation level, how soft 
activities can be done, especially as regards to limiting these kinds of activities only to 
specific types of projects 187. The raised concerns include questions about organising 
training courses, so far a common activity funded under the LEADER programme, but 
in the new period limited to knowledge transfer projects with very limited eligible target 
groups188. Also there are series of questions about the actual organisation and timeline 
of co-operation activities, be it joint activities of regular project applicants189 or co-
operation projects between LAGs either within Estonia or internationally190. This shows 
that at the beginning of the new programming period, there is a lot of confusion 
amongst LAGs on what kind of soft activities are allowed to be done under LEADER 
and under which conditions. In the LAG survey (see Chapter 1.3 for more details on 
carrying out the survey and the questionnaire in Appendix 1), there was an open 
question191 where respondents were asked to state the three biggest limitations they are 
facing in their day-to-day activities. Based on qualitative content analysis, limitations to 
                                                           
187For example see http://www.maainfo.ee/?page=3767 FAQ questions 1 and 35 
188For example see http://www.maainfo.ee/?page=3767 FAQ questions 10, 34 and 36 
189For example see  http://www.maainfo.ee/?page=3767 FAQ questions 9 and 39 
190For example see http://www.maainfo.ee/?page=3767 FAQ questions 16, 18 and 19 
191Question 1  in the LAG questionnaire: What have been the biggest problems your LAG has faced in 
relation with LEADER implementation (coming from legislative regulations and restrictions) at the 
launch of 2014-2020 programming period (name up to 3 problems) ? 
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soft projects was among the most common replies192.  Using a “checklist” (see the 
results in Appendix 2)193 helped to validate this result and indicated that more than ¾ of 
the respondents194 find it limiting that soft projects can be carried out only under 
specific, restrictive conditions. Respondent states: “When earlier a project applicant 
could ask for a single grant to organize an event to promote life in the local community, 
then now there is an obligation to do multiple-year activities together with partners.” 
Another respondent finds “Co-operation is definitely important for networking in a 
region, but in my understanding it considerably restricts carrying out “soft” activities. 
[...] when launching new networks it cannot be presumed that they have at once the 
capability to carry out a co-operation project.” 
To further elaborate on this restriction, which the LAGs clearly find undue, a 
comparison can be made with the previous programming period when it had been left 
up to the LAGs to decide in their LDSs what kind of activities they want to support in 
their region and there had been no specific limitations on soft activities. Also the LAG 
survey revealed that when comparing the present period with the previous one195, 
introducing considerable limitations on activities that can be supported by projects was 
seen by the LAGs as one of most common changes for worse.  
This means that the LAGs, which previously had a high degree of autonomy in 
deciding what kind of activities to support, are now facing difficulties in understanding 
what kind of activities they can support and what kind of activities are not eligible any 
more. And even worse, the project beneficiaries are not able to carry out any more the 
activities for which there is a locally identified need, but they have to fit these into a 
narrow framework of specific project types. 
The limitations on soft projects do not derive from the supranational level, i.e. the 
restrictive regulation identified by the majority of LAGs does not derive from EU level 
regulations. The EU regulations 1303/2013 and 1305/2013 do not set any restrictions on 
soft activities or other activities to be carried out by project beneficiaries. Moreover, the 
LEADER measure fiche explaining these regulations explicitly states that the LDS 
                                                           
192This limitation was stated by 7 respondents in Question 1 and by additional 4 respondents in Question 
2, thus total of 11 respondents find it to be among the top 3 restrictions to day-to-day activities of LAGs. 
193Question 3 provided a check-list of 17 restrictions which the respondents had to evaluate. 
194See the results for Question 3.15 in Appendix 2 
195Question 2 in the LAG questionnaire: Compared with the previous programming period, are the 
problems the same or have they changed (please explain) ? 
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should be the main criterion to assess the eligibility of projects and that MSs are invited 
to offer LAGs a large scope of action. Also the special report of European Court of 
Auditors recommends: “Member States should amend their rules as necessary to allow 
LAGs to develop local solutions that do not correspond to the rural development 
programme measures.196” This reveals a wide gap between EU level expectations and 
the actual implementation of LEADER and contradicts the best-known principle of 
LEADER – the bottom-up approach, and hinders also another principle, namely 
facilitation of innovation. It is usually argued that the local government has an 
information advantage over the upper-tier governments when it comes to policy 
implementation. The main reason for this informational advantage has to do with 
political accountability. In the matter of delivering services as well as in local business 
development (both being areas funded by LEADER), control rights in governance 
structures should be assigned to people who have the requisite information and 
incentives and at the same time will bear responsibility for the consequences of their 
decisions. In many situations, this insight calls for more devolution of power to the local 
level.197 The bottom-up approach, the most distinctive feature of LEADER, is exactly 
about the local actors participating in decision-making and in the selection of the 
priorities to be pursued in their local area. Thus the local level should be granted the 
autonomy to decide, what kind of activities can be supported under projects.  
 
Concerns on LAG operational level 
A second set of concerns raised by LAGs is regarding the operational mechanisms, 
especially those concerning decision making at the LAGs in order to avoid conflict of 
interest and to guarantee transparency.  
There is confusion about when and how exactly it is needed for the board 
members to use abstention from voting when they are approving the list of projects that 
have been evaluated and ranked by the evaluation committee198. Based on qualitative 
content analysis of the LAG managers’ survey’s opening question, it can be said that 
abstention of board members was a relatively common limitation faced by the LAGs199.  
                                                           
196(European Court of Auditors, 2010) p 59 
197(Bardhan, 2002) p 191 
198For example see http://www.maainfo.ee/?page=3767 FAQ questions 32, 43 and 44 
199Stated among the top 3 limiting requirements by 5 LAG managers. 
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Using the checklist helped to validate this result and indicated that more than ¾ of the 
respondents200 consider their LAGs constrained in carrying out their day-to-day 
activities by the restriction that the board has to follow the rule of abstention in the same 
manner as is required from the evaluation committee members. According to a 
respondent: “The requirement of abstention, when approving the list of ranked project 
proposals, creates a situation where approving the list has become difficult also at the 
general assembly. This requirement has not taken account of the uniqueness of local 
initiative.”201  
The requirement on board abstention does not come from the supranational level. 
Once again, this restrictive regulation identified by the majority of LAGs does not 
derive from EU level regulations. The EU regulations 1303/2013 and 1305/2013 do not 
set specific restrictions on board abstention.  The CPR 1303/2013 sets as the task of a 
LAG to draw up a non-discriminatory and transparent selection procedure, which 
avoids conflict of interest. The LAG has to ensure that at least 50% of the votes in 
selection decisions are cast by partners which are not public authorities202 and that no 
single interest group represents more than 49% of the voting rights.203 The EAFRD 
regulation 1305/2013 does not further regulate decision-making nor introduce any 
additional restrictions on the matter. This reveals there is a gap between EU level 
regulation and the actual implementation of LEADER. 
Another problematic issue in the eyes of the LAGs is that of required rotation of 
evaluation committee as well as board members. More than ¾ of the respondents report 
it is limiting their LAG’s day-to-day activities that a third of the projects selection 
committee members have to rotate within 3 years of their election and more than ½ of 
the respondents find it limiting that a third of the board members have to rotate after the 
term of their election ends204. Respondent states: “The forced rotation of selection 
committees and boards is too much, even though it may seem to be democratic.” 
Another respondent finds: “I do not favour rotation of the selection committee, because 
LEADER strategy is long-term and needs sustainability. Project evaluators carry with 
                                                           
200See the results for Question 3.13 in Appendix 2 
201The MA has suggested as a solution that when majority of board members have to use abstention and 
thus the board can not make a decision, the list of projects should be approved by the general assembly.  
202Article 34 1.(b) of 1303/2013 
203Article 32 2.(b) of 1303/2013 
204See the results for Question 3.9 and 3.14 in Appendix 2 
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them experiences and knowledge about projects from year to year.” Similarly, more 
than ½ of the respondents205 find it restrictive that a person can participate and vote at a 
general assembly only as a representative of one member. In LEADER LAG there can 
be a case when a person is a sole proprietor or has a one-man company, which is a 
member of the LAG, and the same person is at the same time the legal representative 
(e.g. chairman of board) of an association, which is also a member of the LAG. In this 
specific case the person is forced to decide, which one of the two legal persons it 
represents at the general assembly, since it is forbidden to represent two members at the 
same time. According to a respondent one of the biggest problems faced by their LAG 
is the fact that harsher limitations are set on LAGs than foreseen by other national 
legislation (e.g. the law regulating non-profit organisations). About this specific 
requirement the respondent states: “Considerably limits the possibility of a member to 
participate in the decision making process. When the same person belongs to the board 
of different member organisations, then according to all other Estonian Republic laws 
he has a legal right to represent that organisation.” The respondent further explains: “It 
is not understandable especially in the context of rural areas [...] – public transportation 
is often inadequate [...] and it is in every way sensible that in a situation when 1 person 
can be sent to a meeting, it does not make sense for 4-5 people to travel.” 
Again, a gap can be identified between the actual implementation of LEADER 
and EU level regulation. The EU level regulations 1303/2013 and 1305/2013 do not 
include a requirement of rotation neither for the selection committee nor for the board.  
The task of a LAG is to guarantee non-discriminatory and transparent selection of 
projects, avoiding conflict of interest.  
According to the LAG questionnaire, almost 2/3 of the respondents206 found the 
list of items included under indirect costs (reimbursed to the LAG based on simplified 
cost calculation mechanism), restrictive of their daily activities. Respondent states: “The 
list of indirect costs includes many types of [direct] costs e.g. transport costs and 
purchase of office equipment.” CPR 1303/2013 provides three alternatives for flat rate 
financing of indirect costs, including a flat rate of up to 25 % of eligible direct costs, 
provided that the rate is calculated “on the basis of a fair, equitable and verifiable 
calculation method or a method applied under schemes for grants funded entirely by the 
                                                           
205See the results for Question 3.8 in Appendix 2 
206See the results for Question 3.16  in Appendix 2 
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Member State for a similar type of operation and beneficiary”. 207 None of the three 
alternatives introduces a list, what kind of activities are to be included as direct costs 
and also regulation 1305/2015 does not touch upon this issue. Hence also here a gap can 
be identified between the EU level regulations and the actual LEADER implementation 
in Estonia. 
The qualitative content analysis of the opening question identified that LAGs see 
as the biggest problem to their daily operations issues related with interpreting national 
level regulation208. This includes the MA and the Paying Agency interpreting regu-
lations differently209, civil servants within one organisation are interpreting regulations 
differently, interpretation is changing over the course of time, and the regulations being 
formulated in a manner that leaves much space for interpretation, e.g. eligibility of 
projects. The othe major problem identified by LAGs based on this open question was 
the long delay with launching the 2014-2020 programming period210, especially very 
late adoption of national level LEADER regulation as well as limited and last-minute 
involvement of LAGs in its formulation. The other most common problems identified 
were those of limiting soft projects and abstention of board members, as described 
already above.  
Hence LAGs have shown dissatisfaction with the activities of the national level 
regarding LEADER regulation, they do not refer much to the EU level regulation as 
constraining them. Content analysis of the second question, comparing the problems 
between the current and the previous programming period, identifies a prevailing 
negative connotation211, hence LAGs are experiencing a change for worse. Respondent 
states: “An additional concern is the space for interpretation and different 
understandings. ARIB interprets as it wishes, Ministry interprets as it wishes and the 
LAG is trying to figure out what is going on.” Other respondent states: “Most 
concerning is increasing bureaucracy and the additional restrictions (in the personal 
                                                           
207See Article 68 in CPR 1303/2013  (European Parliament and of the Council, 2013) ; the alternative set 
in Article 68 1 a) is the one chosen to be incorportated into Estonian national regulation 
208Seen as problematic by 15 LAGs, based on content analysis 
209
 According to a MA representative (Gorban, 2016) the MA sees the general framework of the policy 
and the reasons why certain goals have been set, but the Paying Agency sees a specific document to prove 
the eligibility of a certain cost item and problems in day-to-day implementation of the policy. He states 
that amendments in national regulation come from the experiences gained during implementation. 
210Seen as problematic by 13 LAGs, based on content analysis 
21117 LAGs have identified negative aspects of change, 4 LAGs have identified in addition to negative 
ones positive aspects of change and 4 respondents find that the problems have remained the same. 
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opinion of the respondent often quite absurd) put on Leader LAGs which are harsher 
than general legislation in the country.” 
Despite the fact that the LAG survey shows dissatisfaction with the additional 
restrictions introduced by the national level, it is quite exceptional for a single LAG to 
bypass the state level and directly contact the EC.212 Also for the EC it is rather an 
exception, not a rule to deal with such complaints about the national level and in 80-
90% of cases the reply from the EC is to contact the national MA in case of problems 
identified by the local level. The EC does not really have a formal way of helping the 
local level, unless there has been a clear infringement, in the case of which there will be 
checks performed. Also the position of the European umbrella organisation for national 
LEADER associations, ELARD,213 is not very strong in DG Agri as the organisation 
lacks financial as well as human resources for active lobbying, admits Brosei214.  
As can be seen from the empirical analysis above, the LAGs are facing additional 
restrictions to their day-to-day activities both as regards to project activities as well as 
the functioning of the LAG itself. The present section has highlighted six requirements  
found most restrictive and undue by the LAGs215. These restrictions, introduced by the 
national level and not the EU level, hinder the LAGs to organize their procedures in a 
manner where local level needs and EU level expectations, like the general spirit of 
LEADER and its key principles, would be met, and at the same time the restrictions 
duly followed. LAGs are clearly on position that they should be given bigger rights in 
the LEADER implementation system216. As can be seen from comparing the EU level 
regulations in section 3.1, and the restrictions under which the local level is operating, 
described in the current section, the actual degree of autonomy in implementation of 
LEADER in Estonia is not as high as has been intended and originally devised by the 
EU level. The additional level involved in the MLG arrangement of LEADER besides 
                                                           
212According to LAG managers survey Question 4 only 4 LAGs out of the 23 that participated in the 
survey had taken direct contact with the Commission regarding the problems that they had encountered 
regarding the national level. Eg LAG Borderlands Leader contacted the EC about the eligibility of VAT 
for local authorities (since the Ministry of Agriculture was on position that VAT can not be claimed back 
by local authorities) and got a confirmation from the Commission that in fact it can be claimed back. As a 
result national level legislation was changed. 
213According to LAG managers survey Question 5, only 2 LAGs had taken direct contact with ELARD.  
214Personal communication: (Brosei, 2016) 
215The 6 restrictions which passed the 50% threshold of being very limiting or somewhat limiting to the 
dat-to-day operation of LAGs, based on replies to Question 3 of the LAG managers’ questionnaire. 
216According to LAG managers survey Question 7, 21 LAGs out of the 23 which responded stated that 
LAGs should be entitled bigger rights in LEADER implementation.  
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the EU and local levels is the national one, whose involvement in shaping LEADER 
implementation will be explored in the following sub-chapter 3.3. 
 
3.3 National level requirements to LEADER implementation in Estonia 
 
As identified in the previous sub-chapter, there are several restrictions with regard to the 
autonomy of action already faced by LAGs, and expected to be faced by project 
beneficiaries, when implementing the LEADER programme in Estonia during the 2014-
2020 period. As MLG theory suggests, then each level in the MLG setting has its own 
interests and in the case of Estonia it is the national level holding tight control of the 
governance arrangement, retaining its role as a firm gatekeeper. Hence the constraints 
regarding the degree of autonomy that the LAGs are facing have their roots in additional 
limitations introduced by the national level legislation. This means that the gap 
identified in the previous sub-chapter, which can be observed between the supranational 
level (aiming to give a high degree of autonomy to the local level) and the much more 
constrained actual implementation at the local level, is due to additional regulation. The 
latter being, although in the interest of the national level, not always necessary for 
bringing the EU level regulation downwards and in many cases undue, i.e. neither in the 
spirit of the LEADER approach nor good governance principles, but even against.  
In the present thesis, national level influence on the implementation of the RD 
governance arrangement at the sub-national level is measured by two criteria: a)  
implications on the LAG as a local level actor (its structure, setup, decision making) and 
b) requirements on project applicant’s specific project activities (what kind of things, 
based on LEADER funded projects can actually be done in rural areas to promote rural 
development, thus the actual outcome of the rural development policy).  This means that 
LEADER implementation at the local level in this thesis covers both the LAG as well as 
the project activities and the requirements set on LAGs also have a direct influence on 
the projects and thus the outcome of the RD policy as such. The present sub-chapter 
will bring out the way in which the national level shapes the policy by defining the 





RDP requirements on LAGs 
According to Estonian RDP, the overall objective of the LEADER measure is to ensure 
balanced regional development through the implementation of its key elements.217  How 
this objective can be achieved and what is the outcome of the specific RD governance 
arrangement, is strongly influenced by the state.  
According to the opinion expressed by a civil servant from the Ministry of 
Agriculture at a RDP preparatory steering committee meeting218, one of the most 
important changes in LEADER in comparison with the previous programming period is 
the need to have at least three local governments as LAG members (earlier two was the 
minimum requirement). It is the RDP eligibility conditions set for LAGs219 that 
establish as a criterion the requirement to have at least three local governments as LAG 
members – meaning that a LAG has to compose of the territory of at least three local 
authorities. Administrative reform in Estonia (expected to be finalized by October 2017) 
remains a contingency which will significantly affect the composition of LAGs in 
Estonia and there is a danger that after the reform many LAGs will not fulfil the 
minimum criterion any more220. This issue has been brought to the attention of the MA, 
but the MA has decided to deal with this issue once the reform takes place221. Ex-ante 
evaluation report of the Estonian RDP 2014-2020 does not provide any additional 
insight to the issue and only states that the LEADER measure will continue on the basis 
of the LAGs, yet it is not excluded that some LAGs may be added or removed.222 
According to an interview with the MA representative223, the requirement of three local 
authorities was introduced to guarantee more co-operation than that based on just two 
authorities, and the requirement will be revised, if necessary. 
According to the RDP, there is a separate sub-measure of LEADER (Sub-measure 
19.4)224 which is meant for the LAG’s running and animation costs. RDP limits these 
costs to 20% of the LEADER budget, which is lower than the EU limit of 25% set by 
                                                           
217(Põllumajandusministeerium, 2015a) p 252 
218(Põllumajandusministeerium, 2013) p 11 
219(Põllumajandusministeerium, 2015a) p 254 
220At the moment the survey respondents do not find this requirement restrictive, however there were 
comments that this could pose a problem after the administrative reform takes place. 
221
 According to MA representative (Kimmel, 2016) LAGs can operate having their current set-up until 
the results of the administrative reform have become clear. 
222(Ernst & Young Baltic AS, the Institute of Baltic Studies and OÜ Hendrikson & Ko, 2014) p 66 
223Personal communication: (Gorban, 2016) 
224(Põllumajandusministeerium, 2015a) p 259 
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1303/2013, even though the EC in LEADER fiche225 names as one improvement in 
comparison with the previous programming period greater focus on animation and 
capacity building, which could among other things be achieved with increasing the 
respective budget. Even though the LAGs have not identified it among the six most 
constraining restrictions, almost half of the respondents226 do find it restrictive and this 
more restrictive regulation still represents a reduction of degree of autonomy of the 
local level, as the national legislation has reduced what was intended by the EU level. 
An interviewee at the Paying Agency representative227 finds that 20% for administrative 
costs for LAGs is excessive. He proposes a solution to decrease the number of LAGs to 
approximately 15 in Estonia, which would enable to cut down the administrative costs 
and to direct the remaining funds to grant additional project support. MA representative 
228
 finds that it is a political decision to have the entire country covered with LAGs and 
no-one wants to make a political decision that this or this area will be left out of the 
LEADER programme.  
 
EU CAP Implementation Act requirements on LAGs 
An Estonian legislative act on how Estonia should implement CAP, namely European 
Union Common Agricultural Policy Implementation Act229, regulates in § 69 the 
aspects relating to LAG and its LDS. In addition to the issues regulated on EU level it 
sets several additional requirements that substantially decrease the autonomy of the 
local level.  A fundamental requirement influencing the everyday operations of the LAG 
as an association is the condition set by the act that a person may participate and vote in 
a general meeting of the LAG only as a representative of one legal person, i.e. represent 
only one member. A member of a LAG cannot participate or vote in a general meeting 
as a representative of another member.230 As was identified in the previous sub-chapter 
through the LAG survey, this national rule represents a very serious restriction of 
autonomy of the LAG. The restriction means, that even though on one hand the idea is 
to make LAGs very inclusive, in practice this requirement can prevent some legal 
                                                           
225(European Commission, 2014) p 2 
226See the results for Question 3.1 
227Personal communication: (Treufeldt, 2016) 
228
 Personal communication: (Kimmel, 2016) 
229(Riigikogu, 2015) p 1 
230Ibid., p 20-21 
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persons from joining a LAG in the first place or even if an organisation does join, it 
may be restrained from participating in the decision making at the general assembly, if 
the authorised representative of one organisation is at the same time also the authorised 
representative of another LAG member. As it is not allowed to delegate a vote to 
another member of the organisation, but only to someone outside the LAG, this may 
lead to a situation where people who do not have enough information about the LAG 
are participating in decision-making, which could endanger making wise decisions. 
According to the act the LAG has to ensure that at least three of its board 
members must be individual members of the LAG or representatives of the entity 
members of the LAG231. As a physical person cannot be a LAG member in Estonia, 
what this requirement actually says is that at least three board members have to be 
amongst LAG members, and the remaining board members can be any other people 
elected on the board without the need to be a member. Even though LAGs do not find 
this requirement restrictive232 to their operations in the survey, it is a considerable 
additional requirement for LAGs when compared to other Estonian legal persons233. 
There is also another requirement set on the board ‒ one-third of the board members are 
replaced upon expiry of the term of office of the board.234 As was identified in the 
previous sub-chapter, the LAGs do see this requirement as an undue restriction. A 
representative of the MA235 explains that a working group gathered 4-5 times to map 
problems in LEADER implementation and to propose solutions for the new period. She 
comments introduction of the board rotation requirement as follows: “As selection of 
projects was considered to be a rather non-transparent process and the decisions of 
evaluation results were seen as allocating grants to buddies, then to dispel this opinion 
the requirements of board and evaluation committee members were introduced.”   What 
could be an implication is that introducing such rotation requirement may result in loss 
of skilled staff, as has been identified also in LEADER literature.  
The requirements introduced above demonstrate restriction of autonomy of the 
LAG by the national level, as identified from documentation analysis and confirmed by 
                                                           
231(Riigikogu, 2015)p 20-21 
232See the results for Question 3.10 
233As also stated by one of the survey respondents, the requirement is specific to LEADER and harsher 
than foreseen in other national level regulations, eg the law regulating non-profit organisations. 
234(Riigikogu, 2015) p 20-21 
235Personal communication (Kimmel, 2016) 
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empirical analysis, namely the LAG survey as described in the previous sub-chapter. 
Even though well-meant in the first place to avoid possible emerging situations of 
conflict of interest and to help to ensure transparency, as a result the local level 
autonomy is unduly restricted and the bottom-up idea of LEADER undermined.  
 
Minister of Rural Affairs regulation’s requirements on LAGs 
According to the CAP Implementation Act, further requirements for the LAG, including 
requirements for the articles of association, membership, management, period and 
region of operation of the LAG are established by a regulation of the minister of Rural 
Affairs, as shown below. The regulation of the Minister of Rural Affairs on Local 
Action Group support and Leader project support236 regulates implementation of RDP 
Measure 19, i.e. the LEADER measure. There are some new requirements also coming 
from this regulation, relevant for LEADER implementation.  
As one of the main tasks of the LAG is to evaluate project applications and select 
the ones to be funded, the regulation establishes several requirements for the LAGs in 
this field in its § 21 to guarantee transparency. First it is established, that the LAG must 
guarantee that the project evaluation committee cannot have members from the LAG’s 
board. This requirement is not found excessively constraining by the LAGs according to 
the survey237. Secondly rotation is established ‒ one-third of the evaluation committee 
members are replaced within three years from the date they were elected.  This 
requirement was among the biggest constraints identified by the LAGs in the survey. 
Introducing such rotation requirement may result in loss of skilled staff and LAGs find 
it undue. Even though well-meant in the first place to avoid possible emerging 
situations of conflict of interest and to help to ensure transparency and increase 
accountability, the restriction however impedes on the workability of the LAG’s project 
selection committee and is unduly undermining the bottom-up idea as other, less 
restrictive ways could have been possible to achieve the same outcome. The regulation 
also introduces a requirement for the LAG to guarantee that evaluation committee 
member and the project applicant are not related parties as to Administrative Procedure 
Act § 10 (1) and in the case they are, the evaluation committee member cannot take part 
                                                           
236(Maaeluminister, 2015) p 21 
237See the results for Question 3.11 in Appendix 2 
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of evaluation. The LAGs do not see it as an overly restrictive requirement238. The 
evaluation committee members anyway have to abstain from evaluation process in case 
of conflict of interest (abstaining from evaluating all projects in the evaluation round). 
Thus, in fact, the evaluation committee is automatically all the time “rotating”. There is 
a new configuration of evaluators for each of the evaluation rounds, as replacement 
evaluation committee members take over the tasks of the regular members when these 
have abstained because of conflict of interest. Therefore, application of both of the 
requirements is excessive and LAGs find the rotation requirement undue. 
The evaluation committee makes a ranking of the projects and this list has to be 
approved by the board of the LAG. Even though not directly introduced in the 
regulation, the MA presents its interpretation of the clause of preventing conflict of 
interest in the explanatory document on the regulation.239 According to this explanation, 
in case of conflict of interest, also board members have to abstain from voting. As was 
seen in the LAG survey, this is considered to be a major constraint. Board members 
have the role of just „putting an approving stamp“ on the evaluation committee’s 
proposal (the members of which already had to use abstention in case of conflict of 
interest). The board does not have a possibility to change the order of ranking 
introduced by project selection committee. This double-abstention, even though 
introduced for the sake of prevention of conflict of interest, presents again a reduction 
of autonomy of the local level. It is likely to lead to a situation where the majority of the 
board would have to use abstention, because usually LAG board members are very 
active members of local community and the likelihood to have conflict of interest with 
at least one of the presented projects in the application round is relatively big.  
Even though the restriction comes from the MA’s concern for the functioning of 
the measure at the local level, for the LAGs it creates additional bureaucracy in 
convening another general assembly meeting and intervenes in the functioning and 
management of the LAG, taking away the role of the board and giving it to the general 
assembly. According to an interviewee at the MA240 the reason for requiring the board 
to approve the list of ranked projects in the first place comes from the fact that the 
evaluation committee is considered as an expert and decision can be made by a legally 
                                                           
238See the results for Question 3.12 in Appendix 2 
239(Maaeluministeerium, 2015) 
240Personal communication (Kimmel, 2016) 
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representative organ, i.e. the board. However, she admits that perhaps this requirement 
could be re-considered during the programming period. Also the interviewee at the 
ARIB241 finds that most likely the requirement has been introduced, because no better 
alternative was found, and is of opinion that perhaps the requirement can be simplified. 
Another national level limitation related to evaluation of project applications 
comes from the division of roles between the LAG and the Paying Agency. Namely, the 
interpretation of the Paying Agency of the national legislation in Estonia is, that LAGs 
are not allowed to „take out from project application’s budget the items which are not 
reasonable“. It is not allowed for the LAG’s evaluation committee to decide to grant 
only part of the applied sum. And the result is, that if in general it is a good project 
which should be funded, and there are only some „unnecessary“ cost included, then 
these automatically get funded too even though the LAG would prefer to take them out. 
Even though this requirement is not considered to be overly constraining by LAGs 
according to the survey242, it means that the LAGs cannot decide according to their best 
judgement which costs are effective and which are not. This reflects a contradiction 
with the intentions of the EU level, as the Court of Auditors has said in its report243 that 
LAGs are responsible for making bad funding decisions. Again it can be observed how 
the national level limits the autonomy of the local level by not allowing it to perform a 
duty which would be expected by the EU level.  
In the interview the Paying Agency representative244 was on position that this 
requirement of not taking out excessive costs has been introduced, because there is no 
longer an administrative contract signed between the LAG and ARIB, and thus the LAG 
is no longer an administrative body245. As having no contract for the LAGs means that 
the project applicants ‒ when not satisfied with the decision made on their application ‒ 
make an objection to ARIB not the LAG (and ultimately could sue the Paying Agency), 
it has been the decision of ARIB to introduce this approach. There is a contradictory 
position at the MA, and an interviewee expresses: “otherwise having LEADER does not 
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 According to the interview with MA representative (Gorban, 2016) abandoning the administrative 
agreement was most likely the biggest change for LAGs in the present programming periood when 
compared to the previous periood. According to the other MA representative (Kimmel, 2016) already at 




make sense at all”.246 The MA is of understanding that when the evaluation procedures 
and regulations of the LAG foresee excluding such costs from the budget, then this 
should be acceptable. This contradiction is an example of the biggest problem stated by 
the LAGs in the opening question of the survey – namely contradicting positions of the 
MA and the Paying Agency as well as the possibility to interpret regulations in different 
ways. This puts the LAGs in a very complicated position, when performing their day-to-
day activities, as there is no security in how it is correct to act under the “vague” 
regulation. 
The regulation in § 17 on reimbursement of indirect costs presents a list of costs 
which are to be considered as indirect costs and reimbursed as a flat rate of 20% of 
direct eligible costs. As was identified in the LAG survey247, the list of costs considered 
to be indirect is found restrictive by LAGs. Also setting the limit to 20% is an additional 
restriction when compared to EU legislation, which would allow a 25% rate.  
To summarize, it can be said that when the EU level has just stated in regulation 
1303/2013 that the task of a LAG is to draw up a non-discriminatory and transparent 
selection procedure, then the national level has taken this far further. From the section 
above we have seen how many additional limitations and restrictions it brings to the 
local level. This seriously hinders the everyday operations of the LAGs, as was also 
indentified by the LAG survey, and runs against the bottom-up spirit stressed by the EU 
level. Even more – it also endangers democracy. E.g. even though on one hand the 
national legislation states that membership to LAG must be open to everyone, thus 
giving everyone a chance to get elected on the board, then in reality, for the LAG to 
“end up” with a board that meets all the requirements set by the different regulations (as 
well as its own articles of association), the members have to be carefully selected well 
in advance and the general assembly is just a formal act of making this pre-selection 
legitimate. A similar problem has been identified in a case-study in Finland248. 
 
  
                                                           
246Personal communication (Kimmel, 2016) 
247See Appendix 2 results for Question 3.16 
248See: (Nousiainen & Mäkinen, 2015) 
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Minister of Rural Affairs regulation’s requirements on projects 
The regulation’s section on project support § 28 (3) 249 sets a limit that support can be 
applied for activities not specifically listed in § 30 (2) only if they are implemented as 
part of a LAG co-operation project (Article 44 ), a co-operation project involving at 
least two entities (Article 35) or a knowledge transfer project (Article 14). The types of 
costs listed in § 30 (2) are mainly investment costs (e.g. construction, infrastructure, 
fixed assets e.g. machinery, equipment). What this actually means for the project 
applicant is that “soft projects”, which have been very common in LEADER during the 
previous programming period, can only be done if they fit under Article 14 (knowledge 
transfer and information actions), Article 35 (Co-operation) or Article 44 (LEADER co-
operation activities) of 1305/2013. Taking into account the LEADER principles as well 
as recommendations from the EC, this is a serious limitation. Also the LAGs see it as a 
huge restriction, as was identified in the previous sub-chapter. Article 44 can be 
implemented only by LAGs and Article 14 very clearly sets focus of the soft activity to 
take the form of knowledge transfer to beneficiaries who must be SMEs. This means 
that regular project applicants can only do soft projects if they fit into the framework of 
the co-operation Article 35. The article says that the project cannot be done alone by a 
single entity but must be done in co-operation with at least one more entity. This means 
that soft projects falling below this threshold, even if otherwise in line with the LAG’s 
LDS, cannot be funded because the decision that at least two partners count as an 
efficient size for local level soft projects, was pre-given by the national level. 
The fact that it was not EU intention to put LEADER projects under Article 35 is 
demonstrated by the guidance document on „Co-operation measure“250 which makes 
clear difference between the measure and LEADER approach, stating that the Co-
operation measure will support more specific, less comprehensive co-operation than 
LEADER. This once more indicates that limiting all „soft projects“ of LEADER under 
this Article is not very appropriate because it goes against the initial EU level intentions. 
EC implementing regulation (EU) No 808/2014251 complements the Regulation 
1303/2013 regulation stating that in RDP measure description there shall be description 
of the obligatory CLLD elements of which the LEADER measure is composed and 
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description of coordination mechanisms foreseen with other operations, like cooperation 
under Article 35. This shows that the EC is concerned about making clear difference 
between projects funded under LEADER and projects funded under Article 35. Yet 
national legislation has been designed in a way to fit the soft projects of LEADER there. 
The EC is concerned about making clear difference between LEADER projects 
and projects under standard RDP measures. LEADER measure fiche states  
  
Keeping in mind the small scale and integrated character of LEADER projects as 
well as the bottom-up decision-making inherent to LEADER, but also drawing 
lessons from implementation difficulties of LEADER axis, it is recommended not 
to strictly bind the activities under LEADER to the standard measures as defined 
in the programme.  
 
It is also suggested that to allow for a maximum of flexibility to accommodate a variety 
of local projects, MA could consider indicating what is not eligible instead of trying to 
define ex-ante eligible costs, which are difficult to foresee in the context of 
LEADER.252 Here again the EC stresses that LAGs must have „more freedom“ – any 
operation that is in line with general rules of RD  regulation, LEADER priorities and 
LDS could in principle be eligible.253  
Even though Estonian national legislation does directly limit LEADER to an 
existing measure, it de facto forces the soft projects to fit under standard measure 
framework by demanding compliance of activities and costs with requirements under 
certain articles. For degree of autonomy, this means that the national level limits the 
autonomy of the local level to decide what kinds of activities would best meet the local 
demands and by this intervention also seriously contradicts the intention of the EU 
level, which has been demonstrated in many of the documents mentioned above. 
The national level is thereby exploiting a „loophole“ in EU legislation, enabling to do 
this. A former employee of DG Agri brings out in an interview254 that in the previous period’s 
regulation 1698/2005 there was article 64, which was misinterpreted by many MAs resulting in 
an unnecessary limitation of LEADER activities to what was being offered under standard RD 
measures. To correct this mistake, in the regulation for the new period this article was deleted. 
But as there was also no additional article introduced saying „LEADER is free to do what the 
local level wants“, it is again up to the MS to interpret the regulation and devise their 
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legislation. Also correspondence with a present DG Agri employee255 confirms that restrictions 
come very often from the programme authorities, not EU regulations. According to the guide 
for CLLD256 MAs very often add their own restrictions to EU regulations on what types 
of costs cannot be funded. By doing so, they intend to exclude expenses which they do 
not consider a priority for support or which could be problematic from the point of view 
of accounting, audit and control. Experience shows that attempts to define eligible costs 
very precisely leads to endless questions and problems of interpretation whether 
something is eligible or not. This is likely to result in extending the approval of projects, 
especially if decisions are made on an administrative level above the LAG.  
Interviewee at the MA257 admits that the decision on limiting soft activities came 
from the management level of the Ministry258. However she is on position that by 
introducing the requirements of specific articles for LEADER projects, the Ministry has 
not excessively limited LEADER activities, meaning that a lot depends on 
implementation and on how ARIB interprets the requirements. The interviewed ARIB 
representative259 says that the decision to limit soft activities comes from the Ministry. 
According to him, there have been no observations by audits neither from EU or 
national level on soft activities that would result in introducing such a limitation. He is 
of opinion that as the number of co-operation projects was relatively small during the 
previous programming period, this could be one of the reasons to direct soft activities to 
be done in co-operation. 
Observation made in RDP mid-term evaluation report on LEADER says that 
ideally, in the implementing of strategies, the objectives of the strategy measures could 
be accorded more attention than the measure codes.260 A parallel can be brought here 
with the 2014-2020 articles – rather than demanding that the project activities fit under 
the articles it would be more important to see that they are in line with more general 
objectives of RD and more specifically, LEADER. This means that the bottom-up spirit 
of LEADER as an important intention for the policy from EU level, should be first and 
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 The other MA representative (Gorban, 2016) confirms that restricting LEADER activities has been a 
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259Personal communication (Treufeldt, 2016) 
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foremost considered and the national level regulations should leave adequate autonomy 
to the local level to be able to practice this bottom-up, close to grassroots approach both 
in the selection of project activities that best meet the local needs described in the LDS 
as well as in the everyday operational mechanisms of the LAG, avoiding unnecessary 
bureaucracy and overly limitations on sub-national level autonomy. 
 
3.4 Re-embedding findings into research on MLG and LEADER implementation 
 
There is a substantial distance between the official EU documents, which determine the 
content of the LEADER approach, and the MS and local governance networks (LAGs) 
that are the key nested players for implementing the approach. Moreover, even greater 
distance exists between the official documents and the project applicants, who can apply 
for project grants if the projects conform to the LAG’s strategy. 261 As has been 
demonstrated above, the gap is largely due to national level intervention in LEADER 
governance arrangement. Strong role of the national level is not just characteristic to 
LEADER as a RD policy. A study on MLG in Estonian cohesion policy states: 
 
Our survey supports the view of a slight movement towards Type II MLG but Type II 
MLG is not ‘working properly’ in Estonia. The Estonian state is a firm gatekeeper when 
it comes to subnational mobilization and empowerment. It only cautiously enables SNAs 
to become active internationally, while preventing them from actually exerting influence 
by only formally engaging them in areas where requirements dictate this, namely in EU 
cohesion policy.262  
 
As confirmed by the study on Estonian cohesion policy and also seen from the present 
thesis, the national level retains control and holds the position of a firm gatekeeper.  
 According to widespread views in MLG theory this situation, where the national 
level is not allowing the local level the degree of autonomy that would be useful, should 
lead the sub-national level to use the strategy of bypassing the state, but so far in 
Estonian LEADER implementation this is rather an exception than a rule. In the case of 
LEADER in practice it is very difficult for the local level to achieve relevant progress or 
help with this bypassing, because in an interview with a former employee of the 
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Commission263 it was stated that in majority of cases when a local level representative 
makes a complaint about the national level to the Commission, the Commission asks the 
person to contact the MA in the country concerned, i.e. the national level.  
Estonian Leader Union, which is the national umbrella organisation for LAGs in 
Estonia, does not yet bring together all the 26 LAGs and according to a survey264 on the 
capabilities of the Union members of the association find the organisation relatively 
weak.  Half of the respondents had contacted the Union to get assistance. According to 
an interview with the MA representative265, Estonian LEADER Union is important as a 
co-operation partner, but it should see how to become a stronger voice at the negotiation 
tables. According to ARIB representative266, the Union should bring together the large 
majority of Estonian LAGs to be a good co-operation partner. This shows that the 
bypassing potential of Estonian sub-national level is very low at the moment. And as a 
result, this enables the national level to continue to keep its strong gatekeeper role. 
According to Yang et al267, centralised government remains greatly influential as 
it dominates in the policy process design and the procedural enforcements and checks. 
This influence is perceived as largely negative with increasing bureaucracy. Each MS is 
subject to EU audits. If RD policy is in breach of EU rules, financial penalties can be 
incurred to central governments. This explains why the national level often retains 
overall power and influence over RD policy, as a preventive measure.268 If lower 
government levels are given more autonomy, it could pose a control problem for the 
central government. This argument is used to justify more direct forms of 
accountability. However, such safeguards can also influence the behaviour of LAGs and 
applicants, including their motivation to participate from fear of potential financial 
repercussions. In the end, even though accountability will be achieved, it is likely to be 
achieved through limiting the local level autonomy in policy implementation and often 
at the expense of other good governance principles269. This is also evident in LEADER 
where the additional restrictions limit the innovation expected from the approach and 
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endanger motivation to participate. LAG survey respondent states: “Most concerning is 
increasing bureaucracy [...]. In such a situation any kind of motivation is lost [...].” 
Other respondent states: “The simple LEADER has become one of the most 
bureaucratic systems of delivering grants in Estonia. And this is actually very sad.” 
„The future of rural policy in general and LEADER-type activities in particular 
must also in the future continue to be build on responsible people who have the know-
how and the (local) knowledge to implement development projects, people that made 
LEADER already a success in the past“.270 It is important to keep in mind for future 
policy design that for a MLG arrangement to be successful there has to be a clear link 
between the national level’s regulatory requirements and how these link to the actual 
every-day policy implementation. The national requirements should enable the local 
level to actually practice the principles foreseen under MLG and partnership and that 
the everyday practice should not be made overly difficult by the national regulations.  




4. Conclusions and recommendations 
 
MLG offers a framework to analytically grasp the essence of everyday practice of 
European governance in policy areas, which include different actors in the MLG 
arrangement. It focuses on how particular policy processes are working and why a 
certain governance arrangement emerges. In the present thesis, the policy area in focus 
has been RD, and more precisely, the LEADER approach. The original contribution of 
the research has been to provide an in-depth investigation of the LEADER programme 
and the governance arrangement to which LEADER is embedded into in Estonia. 
Spotlight was put on the different levels involved in this RD governance arrangement 
and especially the degree of autonomy granted to the local level in LEADER 
implementation.  
 MLG was the first concept to thoroughly examine the position of the local level 
in EU polity. It assumes that all three levels – the supranational, national and sub-
national levels – have a role to play in shaping the governance arrangement. Based on 
MLG theory the author also expected all the three levels to have their own interests in 
shaping policy implementation. To measure each level involved in the governance 
arrangement, the research put forward three sub-questions, one for each level. 
 To answer the first sub-question “What degree of autonomy is intended by the 
EU in formulating its RD policy?”, the study identified  that according to the EC the 
main idea is to give as much autonomy as possible to the local level and the role of the 
national level is rather seen as supporting the local level. Thus the EU intends the local 
level to have big autonomy in the implementation of the day-to-day activities of 
LEADER as a RD policy. LEADER is meant to operate on two basic principles – 
subsidiarity and partnership. It is the bottom-up method for implementing EU’s RD 
policy. Experience with LEADER implementation since the beginning of 1990ies has 
shown that given the diversity of rural areas, LDSs are more effective and efficient if 
decided and implemented at the local level by local actors. Added value is seen in the 
LEADER implementation model itself, as it leads to improved governance. The present 
research has demonstrated that EU regulations do not overly regulate the functioning of 
LAGs or set limits on the activities of project beneficiaries.  
 To answer the second sub-question „How is LEADER implemented at the local 
level?”, the author investigated the actual implementation of the programme and with 
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the help of a survey among Estonian LAGs established that LAGs are facing major 
restrictions both as regards to project activities (i.e. “soft projects”) of beneficiaries as 
well as the functioning of the LAG itself (e.g. the issues of rotation and abstention), 
which hinder their day-to-day activities. More specifically, these latter restrictions 
include the requirements of board and project selection committee rotation; board 
members’ abstention from voting when approving the project selection committee’s list 
of projects to be funded; and allowing a person to participate and vote at LAG’s general 
assembly only as a representative of one LAG member. LAGs expect that they should 
be given bigger rights in the LEADER implementation arrangement. The findings from 
the survey have indicated that these additional regulations, which LAGs see as a major 
concern to their daily operations, derive from restrictions induced by the national level, 
not the EU level. 
 To answer the third sub-question “What additional restriction on the degree of 
autonomy is introduced by the national level?”, the author first identified the constraints 
raised by the LAGs according to the survey and then analysed national level legislation, 
to explore what restrictions there are to cause the constraints faced by the LAGs. 
Additionally the author compared the national level legislation to the initially devised 
policy as set in EU level regulation. As a result it was identified that the requirements 
have, in fact, been introduced by the national level and are undue because they are 
additional to the EU level restrictions (i.e. not originally contained in the EU level 
documentation) and often not directly necessary to implement the EU level regulation. 
As an added value, based on interviews with civil servants, the author provided initial 
insight into the reasoning why the national level had introduced some specific 
restrictions.  
As had also been previously identified by other researchers in other EU countries 
implementing LEADER, LAGs feel that mainstreaming LEADER into RDPs has rather 
made the approach marginalised. The national level appears to seek to retain its role as a 
firm gate-keeper and introduces additional national rules to LEADER, based on its own 
interests. The character of LEADER as a non-bureaucratic and innovative measure is 
thus undermined and fulfilment of its seven main principles is to an extent weakened 
because of top-down restrictions. As was seen from the literature review, top-down 
restrictions had been faced by the LAGs in the majority of case-studies, either on the 
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structure and operations of the LAG or on project activities. Thus it is a common 
feature, Estonia seemingly not being an exception. This indicates that mainstreaming 
LEADER has influenced its governance arrangement all over the EU.  Unlike in the 
present case-study investigating Estonia, it had not been in focus in previous research, 
from where the restrictions come from – whether from the EU or national level 
regulation, and the case-studies concentrated on a limited number of restrictions.  This 
is the gap in the LEADER scholarship the present study has sought to address. 
The original contribution of the present research has been to fill the gap by 
making a distinct differentiation between EU level and national level requirements and 
by comprehensively mapping the restrictions faced by Estonian LAGs at the start of the 
2014-2020 programming period. The author has demonstrated that restrictions on the 
degree of autonomy, hindering the actual daily functioning of LAGs, were introduced 
by the state level and are additional to the ones set at the EU level. This has provided an 
answer to the main research question – the sub-national level has less autonomy in 
implementing LEADER than the supranational level had initially intended because of 
the way the national level is involved in the governance arrangement and the additional 
restrictions introduced by it. This has confirmed the hypothesis that the involvement of 
the national level plays the decisive role in determining the eventual form of the 
governance arrangement. 
Bringing back in the normative concern of MLG, the author puts forward 
recommendations for a better functioning of LEADER as a MLG arrangement. In the 
light of the normative dimension of MLG as desirable, it is assumed that there clearly is 
value in this form of governance and it is important to consider that some aspects of 
governance, like input-related legitimacy, would not overshadow other aspects like 
output-related legitimacy. The latter meaning, what LEADER actually is meant to be 
about – the possibility to have adequate local autonomy to decide on the most 
appropriate solutions on the local level for the locally identified problems. Despite the 
fact that the regulative role of the national level is often taken to guarantee 
accountability and transparency, at the same time it runs against the wider EU level 
intention of bottom-up approach and LEADER spirit. As LEADER has been recognized 
over the years as a suitable approach for RD, it is important that the essence of the 
programme would not be jeopardized. 
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Taking full advantage of the Estonian presidency of ELARD in 2016-2017, the 
concerns of decreased local level autonomy should be brought directly to the attention 
of the EC in a consolidated form channelled through the ELARD network, and a 
proposition made to amend the EU level regulation so that it would prevent the national 
level from excessively restricting activities to be funded under LEADER (e.g. clearly 
stating in EU level regulations that activities to be funded under LEADER are to be left 
to the LAGs to decide and are not allowed to be limited by the national level). Taking 
advantage of Estonian presidency of the Council of the EU in 2018, serious efforts 
should be made to amend EU level legislation as to make CLLD approach compulsory 
in at least one more ESI Fund in addition to the current EAFRD. 
The state should retain from introducing too many restrictions into national level 
regulation on what kind of activities and costs are eligible, because the EU level has 
intended LEADER to be the RD programme which is bottom-up, close to grassroots 
level and based on local needs identified in the LDS-s. More autonomy should be left to 
the local level so that the LAGs themselves could decide, how to bring their procedures 
and operations to be in line with EU level expectations and requirements, without these 
being set by the national level, as the latter is likely to result in making the everyday 
work of LAGs excessively bureaucratic as well as to create a general atmosphere of 
distrust between the national and sub-national level.  
The local level would need to exploit the opportunities offered by the EU system 
of governance and get more involved in policy formulation stage (e.g. making it clear to 
the EC what might happen), as later on the national level uses its position to restrain. 
The LAGs were less involved in the formulation of the 2014-2020 national level 
regulation than they had been involved in the policy formulation of the previous 
programming period. The consultation process was limited and much more top-down 
than it had been during the previous programming period. This can account as a reason 
why the current additional restrictions introduced in the national level legislation are 
seen as major constraints by the LAGs. What could be the consequences of such 
decreased involvement in policy formulation –  e.g. will there be less motivation on 
local level to contribute voluntarily to RD – is to be found out in the years to come. 
Estonian Leader Union as an umbrella organisation for LAGs would have a stronger 
position and more legitimacy if all Estonian LAGs would be its members (some have 
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not joined because of financial reasons, some do not see the use of being a member). 
This would empower the association to be in a better position to bypass the state level 
and in case of challenges to contact the EU level either directly or via the European 
network, ELARD. The above recommendations for 2020+ LEADER policy planning 
serve the purpose to have CLLD and LEADER implemented in a way that they really 
are in the spirit of MLG, partnership and subsidiarity principles,  and fully develop the 
potential of a local-led, bottom-up driven RD policy in Estonia as well as the EU. 
In the light of the limitations of the present study, the author proposes further 
comparative research, which can build on the present in-depth research. As the present 
research focuses on a single programme, LEADER, a comparative study could be made 
between different programmes – those that represent type I MLG and those that 
represent type II MLG. Generally type II actors (e.g.LEADER) are considered to be 
weaker when put in contact with the national government than type I actors. A 
comparative research would enable to investigate, if this is the case. Another subject of 
research, either separate or combined with the previous one, could be comparison of 
LEADER implementation between more and less centralized countries. This would 
allow to see if the position of the local level in the governance arrangement is 
influenced by the level of centralization. Also comparison of LEADER implementation 
in the three Baltic States during the 2014-2020 programming period would be an 
interesting research area to identify the similarities and differences in implementation 
and the underlying reasons, in relatively similar small countries. As participation of the 
local level in policy formulation fell outside the scope of the present research, it would 
provide an additional avenue for further research. A related research topic is to investi-
gate what are the reasons why CLLD was not implemented in other funds in Estonia 
during the 2014-2020 period. To fully evaluate the impact of the national level’s 
additional requirements on LEADER implementation, introduced for the 2014-2020 
programming period, further research would be needed after the end of the program-
ming period, to find out if and how the limitations have influenced the implementation 
of LEADER on project beneficiary level (e.g. making a comparison of projects’ 
implementation in two programming periods in Estonia). Finally, also research on the 
reasons why the national level has introduced a specific additional restriction would be 





The aim of the present thesis was to investigate why the implementation of RD policies 
may diverge from the originally devised policy at the EU level. The author looked at the 
specific case of LEADER, a bottom-up oriented, participatory RD policy set up as a 
Community Initiative in 1991 and witnessing already a fifth generation of renewal for 
the 2014-2020 programming period.  
MLG was used as the theoretical analytical framework to study European RD 
governance, and more precisely, LEADER as a governance arrangement. Using MLG 
was considered appropriate, because it incorporates the sub-national, national and 
supranational levels in analysis and LEADER presents a governance arrangement, 
which also includes the three levels – European, state and local level.   
Based on MLG theory, all the three levels were expected to have a role to play in 
shaping the governance arrangement. To find an answer to the main research question – 
why does the sub-national level have less autonomy for implementing LEADER than 
the supranational level has initially intended when devising this RD policy – the author 
first looked at the intentions of the EU level, then at the actual policy implementation in 
Estonia and as a result identified the gap in between. 
With the help of literature review and documentation analysis the author found 
out that the initial EU level intention when formulating this RD policy was to devise a 
flexible measure, which would be able to take account of the local situation in a 
community and tackle the locally identified challenges. Thus the main concept of 
LEADER approach, building on the principles of subsidiarity and partnership, is that 
the LDSs composed by LAGs should be the basis for making funding decisions on 
projects to be granted support. The grassroots level is on the position to make wisest 
decisions on the local development solutions. The EC has formulated 7 key principles 
of LEADER approach, and these are meant to be taken as guidelines for both the 
national level as well as the local level when implementing the policy. Also the Court of 
Auditors has stressed the importance of following these principles. Analysing the 
regulatory framework for LEADER during the 2014-2020 programming period the 
author has established that the EU intends the local level to have big autonomy in the 
implementation of the day-to-day activities of LEADER as a RD policy.  
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Taking an insight into LEADER implementation in Estonia at the start of the 
2014-2020 programming period, the author established based on empirical analysis that 
LAGs are facing major constraints, both as regards to project activities of beneficiaries 
as well as the functioning of the LAG itself, which hinder their daily activities. LAGs 
expect that they should be given bigger rights in the LEADER governance arrangement. 
Thus the author has established that there is a gap between the EU level intentions and 
the actual implementation of LEADER at the local level. Using documentation analysis 
the author established that the restrictions which are causing the constraints faced by the 
LAGs have been introduced by the national level, not the EU level. The study also 
established that these national level restrictions are undue ‒ they are additional to the 
EU level restrictions and often not directly necessary to implement EU level regulation.  
Actors on the local level feel that despite the fact that the restrictions may come 
from good intentions to guarantee accountability and transparency, they run against the 
wider EU level intention of bottom-up approach and LEADER spirit. As a result, what 
initially was intended as something to guarantee democracy and participatory decision 
making has due to more and more specific restrictions become a hindrance to the 
normal everyday operations of LAGs. The national level appears to seek to retain its 
firm gate keeping role and to stay in control by introducing additional national rules to 
LEADER, based on its own interests.  
This answers the main research question - the sub-national level has less 
autonomy in implementing LEADER than the supranational level had initially intended 
because of the way the national level is involved in the governance arrangement and the 
additional restrictions introduced by it. This has confirmed the hypothesis that the 
involvement of the national level plays the decisive role in determining the eventual 
form of the governance arrangement. The motives behind this national level 
involvement lie in the national level interests, be it purely political decisions, budgetary 
reasons or mistrust in LAGs’ ability to meet the EU requirements without additional 
specifying national level regulation resulting from fear of possible EU level sanctions.  
The local level improves RD with its bottom-up decision making in a way which 
none of the other levels in the MLG arrangement would be able to provide with the 
same level of effectiveness, so it is important to continuously pursue the key principles 
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LAG Managers’ Questionnaire 
 
LEADER TEGEVUSGRUPPIDE TEGEVJUHTIDE KÜSITLUS 
 




KTG nimi ....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
Ametikoht KTG-s* ........................................................................................................................................ 
(*küsitlus on suunatud eelkõige tegevjuhtidele, ent vajadusel võib vastata ka mõni muu KTG 
igapäevategevustega kursis olev tegevusgrupi töötaja/esindaja) 
 
Kui kaua olete LEADER valdkonnas töötanud?    0-2 aastat     3-5 aastat   üle 5 aasta 
 
1. Millised on teie tegevusgrupi jaoks olnud kõige suuremad LEADER programmi rakendamisega 
seotud probleemid (tulenevalt seadusandlusega kehtestatud regulatsioonidest ja piirangutest), 
millega 2014-2020 programmperioodi käivitamisel kokku olete puutunud (nimeta kuni 3 
probleemi)? 
 
2. Kas võrreldes eelmise programmperioodiga on probleemid jäänud samaks või muutunud (palun 
selgita)? 
 
3. Hinnake, kuivõrd alltoodud nõuded piiravad teie tegevusgrupi tegutsemist LEADER programmi 














1. Kohaliku tegevusgrupi toetuse piiramine 20%-ga 
strateegia rakendamise eelarvest ( Leader määrus 
§ 23 (2) ) (EL regulatsioon lubaks KTG toetuseks 
25%)  
     
2. Vähenduskoefitsiendi kasutamine strateegia 
rakendamise eelarve teise osa arvutamisel (Leader 
määrus § 9 (7) ja (8) ) 
     
3. Nõue, et kohaliku tegevusgrupi liikmeteks peab 
olema vähemalt kolm kohaliku omavalitsuse 
üksust (Leader määrus § 4 (1)) 
     
4. KTG põhikirjale kehtestatud nõuded KTG 
liikmesuse kohta (Leader määrus § 4 (5), (6), (7)) 
     
5. KTG liikmete puhul huvirühma määratlemine 
EMTAK 5. taseme koodi järgi (Leader määrus § 4 
(4) ) 
     
6. KTG otsustusprotsessi nõue alla 50% KOV 
esindatuse osas ((Leader määrus § 5 (2) ) 
     
7. KTG otsustusprotsessi piirang üle 49% huvirühma 
esindatuse osas ((Leader määrus § 5 (3)) 
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8.  Nõue, et KTG üldkoosolekul võib isik osaleda ja 
hääletada ainult ühe liikme esindajana. KTG liige 
ei tohi üldkoosolekul osaleda ega hääletada teise 
liikme esindajana. (ELÜPS § 69 (4) ) 
     
9. Nõue, et 1/3 juhatuse liikmetest vahetub põhikirjas 
ettenähtud juhatuse ametiaja möödumisel. . 
(ELÜPS § 69 (5) ) 
     
10. Nõue, et juhatuse liikmetest vähemalt kolm on 
KTG füüsilisest isikust liikmed või KTG 
juriidilisest isikust liikmete esindajad. (ELÜPS § 
69 (6) ) 
     
11. Nõue, et projektitaotluste hindamise töörühma 
liikmeks ei ole KTG juhatuse liikmed (Leader 
määrus § 21 (4) p 6) 
     
12. Nõue, et projektitaotluste hindamise töörühma 
liige ja projektitaotluste  esitanud isik ei ole 
haldusmenetluse seaduse tähenduses seotud isikud 
ning seotuse korral peab seotud isik end taandama 
(Leader määrus § 21 (4) p 7) 
     
13. Nõue, et taandamise nõudeid järgiks ka KTG 
juhatus või volinike koosolek kui ta kinnitab 
projektitaotluste paremusjärjestuse ettepanekut 
(Leader määruse seletuskiri lk 24) 
     
14. Nõue, et vähemalt 1/3 projektitaotluste hindamise 
töörühma liikmetest vahetub 3 aasta jooksul 
arvates valimisest (Leader määrus § 21 (4) p 8) 
     
15. LEADER projektides pehmete tegevuste läbi 
viimise piiramine vaid teadmussiirde, ühis- ja 
koostööprojektidega. (Leader määrus § 28 (3) ja § 
30 (2) p 7 ) 
     
16. Kaudsete kulude puhul kindla määra (20%) 
rakendamisel kaudseteks abikõlblikeks kuludeks 
loetavate kulude nimistu (Leader määrus § 18 (2) ) 
     
17. Tõlgendus, et peale projektitoetuse taotluse 
esitamist hindamise töörühmale enam midagi 
taotluses muuta ei tohi (KKK tabel 23.03.2016 
vastus küsimusele nr 11)  
     
18. Muu................... (nimeta)      
19. Muu................... (nimeta)      
20. Muu................... (nimeta)      
 
 
4. Kas teie tegevusgrupp on kunagi iseseisvalt pöördunud Euroopa Komisjoni DG Agri või mõne 
muu EL institutsiooni poole, saamaks teavet või abi LEADER programmi rakendamisega seotud 
küsimustes?  
 
 Jah Mis küsimuses? ............................................................................................................................... 
 Ei 
 
5. Kas teie tegevusgrupp on kunagi iseseisvalt pöördunud ELARDi poole, saamaks teavet või abi 
LEADER programmi rakendamisega seotud küsimustes?  
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6. Kas teie tegevusgrupp on kunagi iseseisvalt pöördunud Leader Liidu poole, saamaks teavet või 
abi LEADER programmi rakendamisega seotud küsimustes?  
 Jah Mis küsimuses? ................................................................................................................................ 
 Ei 
 
7. Kuidas saaks LEADER programmi rakendamist Eestis muuta efektiivsemaks? (vali  kuni 2 
varianti) 
 
  praegune süsteem toimib. Ei pea vajalikuks selle muutmist. 
  anda LEADER tegevusgruppidele suuremad õigused programmi rakendamisel 
  anda PRIAle suuremad õigused programmi rakendamisel 
  anda Maaeluministeeriumile suuremad õigused programmi rakendamisel 
  anda Euroopa Komisjonile suuremad õigused programmi rakendamisel 
  kaasata programmi rakendamisse veel mõni täiendav tasand (n maavalitsus, omavalitsuste liit vms) 
  muu ............................ (palun nimeta) 
 










LAG Managers’ survey results for Question 3 
Table 1. LAG Managers’ survey results for Question 3 (starting from most limiting) 
How much do the following requirements limit your LAG’s day-to-day activities 














13. Requirement that the LAG board members also have to follow the rules of 
abstention when they are approving the proposal of projects selected for funding 
by the evaluation committee  
78% 0% 22% 
14.  Requirement of 1/3 project selection/evaluation committee members’ 
rotation  78% 4% 17% 
15.  Limiting soft activities in LEADER projects to knowledge transfer and 
co-operation projects only  
78% 0% 22% 
16.  The list of costs included as indirect costs, for which 20% flat rate is 
applied under the simplified cost calculation mechanism) 
65% 13% 22% 
8.  Requirement for a LAG member to participate and vote at the general 
assembly only as a representative of one member.  57% 0% 43% 
9.  Requirement of 1/3 board members’ rotation  
57% 0% 43% 
1. Limiting LAG’s administration costs to 20% (EU regulation would allow 
25%) 48% 0% 52% 
5.  Using the 5th level code of EMTAK classification as the determinant of an 
“interest group”   48% 13% 39% 
7. Limitation of 49% interest group representation in LAG’s decision-making  
43% 0% 57% 
17.  Restriction to the projects evaluation committee not to take out excessive 
costs from the project applicant’s project budget 43% 9% 48% 
2. Using a reduction coefficient when calculating the second part of LAG’s 
budget for strategy implementation  39% 13% 48% 
11.  Requirement that board members cannot be members of the projects 
selection/evaluation committee  39% 9% 52% 
12.  Requirement that project selection/evaluation committee member and 
project applicant cannot have a situation of “conflict of interest”, otherwise the 
evaluation committee member has to use abstention 
39% 0% 61% 
4.  Requirements about the statutes of the LAG to have certain requirements 
on LAG membership  35% 4% 61% 
6.  Requirement to have less than 50% local authorities participation in 
decision-making  35% 0% 65% 
3.  Requirement that a LAG has to have at least three local governments as 
members 13% 22% 65% 
10.  Requirement of LAG board to have at least 3 member representatives in 
the board   13% 22% 65% 




Interview questions, Mr Pedro Brosei, former staff member of DG Agri, EC. 
22.03.2016 
 
‐ From your practice of working for the European Commission, did it happen for 
LEADER that the local level bypasses the state level and goes directly to the 
„upper level“ (the Commission)? 
‐ How strong in your mind is ELARD ? What has it achieved? 
‐ Will there be LEADER 2020+ ?  
‐ Can you confirm that the EU does not limit in any way what kind of 
activities/costs could be done by project beneficiaries? Meaning that regulations 
1303/2013 and 1305/2013 do not regulate the LEADER projects that are 
submitted to LAGs (i.e. EU level regulation does not say what kind of activities 
can be supported and what kind cannot; what kinds of costs are eligible and 
what are not)? 
‐ Can you confirm that it is not the EU level regulation but Estonian national 
requirement for LAG composition that there must be at least three local 
authorities in a LAG instead of 2 in previous period (i.e. the EU would allow 





Interview questions, Mr Marek Treufeldt,  
Head of the LEADER unit at the Paying Agency (ARIB), 30.03.2016 
 
 
Küsimusi intervjuuks, PRIA, Marek Treufeldt. 30.03.2016 
 
  
-      Miks piiratakse LEADERis “pehmete tegevuste” elluviimist teadmussiirde, 
ühistegevuse ja koostööprojektidega?  
‐ Miks ei tohi tegevusgrupi hindamiskomisjoni liikmed taotleja projekti eelarvest 
üksikuid kulusid välja võtta?   
-      Millistel kaalutlustel on määruses nõue, et juhatus peab projektide pingerea 
kinnitama?  
‐ Milliseid muudatusi tulenevalt DG Agri või ECA auditi tulemustest on Eestis 
LEADERi rakendamisel tehtud? Millised olulisemad leiud on auditiaruannetes 
Eesti kohta välja toodud? 
‐ Miks enam kohalike tegevusgruppidega (KTG) halduslepinguid ei tehtud (miks 
KTG ei ole enam haldusorgan)?  
-      Millised on PRIA ootused Leader Liidule, et organisatsioon oleks PRIAle hea 
koostööpartner?  




Interview questions, Mr Marko Gorban, Head of the Rural Development 
Department of the Ministry of Rural Affairs (Managing Authority), 28.03.2016 
 
Küsimusi intervjuuks, Maaeluministeerium, Marko Gorban. 28.03.2016 
 
‐ Kui LEADER ei oleks kohustuslik, kas siis seda Eestis rakendataks? 
‐ Milline on ministeeriumi seisukoht LEADERi rakendamise osas 2020+?  
‐ Kui suured olid vaidlused, saamaks Eestis LEADERile 9,1% MAKist?  
‐ Mille taha jäi teie nägemuses CLLD rakendamine Eestis teistes fondides? 
‐ Millised on teie hinnangul kõige olulisemad EL tasandi muudatused LEADERis (2014-
2020) võrreldes eelmise perioodiga?  
‐ Millised on teie hinnangul kõige olulisemad siseriiklikud muudatused LEADERis 
(2014-2020) võrreldes eelmise perioodiga?  
‐ Mida näeb ministeerium enda kõige olulisema rolli ja ülesandena LEADER programmi 
rakendamisel?  
‐ Millised on peamised eriarusaamad LEADERi osas ministeeriumi ja PRIA vahel?  
‐ Millised MAKi muudatusettepanekud LEADERI osas on Euroopa Komisjonile kavas 
saata?  
‐ Milline on ministeeriumi nägemus haldusreformi mõju osas KTGdele? Kas KTGde arv 





Interview questions, Mrs Anneli Kimmel, Head of the Local Initiative and Human 
Environment Bureau of the Ministry of Rural Affairs (Managing Authority), 
28.03.2016 
 
Küsimusi intervjuuks, Maaeluministeerium, Anneli Kimmel. 28.03.2016 
 
 
‐ Miks piiratakse LEADERis “pehmete tegevuste” elluviimist teadmussiirde, 
ühistegevuse ja koostööprojektidega?  
‐ Miks ei tohi tegevusgrupi hindamiskomisjoni liikmed taotleja projekti eelarvest 
üksikuid kulusid välja võtta? 
‐ Millistel kaalutlustel on määruses nõue, et juhatus peab projektide pingerea 
kinnitama?  
‐ Miks enam kohalike tegevusgruppidega (KTG) halduslepinguid ei tehtud (miks KTG 
ei ole enam haldusorgan)?  
‐ Miks on kehtestatud nõue, et KTG liikmeks peab olema vähemalt 3 KOV?  
‐ Milliseid muudatusi tulenevalt DG Agri auditiosakonna auditi tulemustest on Eestis 
LEADERi rakendamisel tehtud?  
‐ Miks on Eestis põhimõte, et terve riik on kaetud KTGdega, st et kõiki rahastatakse? 
‐ Millised on ministeeriumi ootused Leader Liidule, et organisatsioon oleks 





    
 
MITMETASANDILINE VALITSEMINE MAAELU ARENDAMISEL – LEADER 




Käesolev magistritöö kasutab mitmetasandilist valitsemist analüütilise raamistikuna, 
uurimaks LEADER programmi kui kohaliku tasandi osalust propageeriva EL maaelu 
arendamise poliitika rakendamist Eestis – väikeriigis, mis on valdavalt jäänud 
väljaspoole mitmetasandilist valitsemist ja LEADERit käsitlevat akadeemilist debatti. 
Töö annab ülevaate kohalike tegevusgruppide, st kohalikul tasandil nimetatud poliitikat 
rakendavate ühingute tegevust reguleerivatest piirangutest 2014-2020 
programmperioodi lävel.  
Vaatamata sellele, et LEADERit tuntakse kui alt-üles põhimõttel toimivat 
lähenemisviisi, kus kohalikele vajadustele leitakse kohalikel ressurssidel ja potentsiaalil 
tuginevad lahendused, mõjutab meetme elluviimist nii mitmetasandiline raamistik kui 
rakendamist reguleeriv seadusandlus, mistõttu kohaliku tasandi tegevus on üsna 
piiratud. Magistritöö eesmärgiks on välja selgitada, miks maaelu arendamise poliitika 
elluviimine kohalikul tasandil võib erineda EL tasandil formuleeritud nägemusest selle 
rakendamise osas. Tulenevalt mitmetasandilise valitsemise teooriast on igal valitsemise 
tasandil – EL (Euroopa Komisjon), riiklikul (Maaeluministeerium ja PRIA) ja kohalikul 
(kohalikud tegevusgrupid) oma huvid, mis kõik mängivad poliitika elluviimisel rolli 
ning kujundavad selle lõpptulemust.  
Esmalt toob uurimus välja kui suurt autonoomsust poliitika elluviimisel EL 
tasand soovis kohalikule tasandile anda ning seejärel võrdleb LEADER programmi 
tegelikku rakendamist Eestis EL tasandi ootustega. Selgitades välja, et EL ootuste ning 
kohaliku tasandi tegevuse vahelise lahknevuse põhjuseks on Eestis riiklikul tasandil 
kehtestatud seadusandlus, mis on rangem kui EL tasand LEADERilt seda nõuaks, leiab 
tõestust hüpotees, et poliitika lõpptulemuse peamiseks kujundajaks on riigi tasand, mis 
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